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車、游泳和跆拳道案例分析

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Final Report

**“How Can the United Kingdom’s Elite Sport Success Inspire Elite Sport Policy in Hong Kong:
The Cases of Cycling, Swimming and Taekwondo”**

“英國精英運動的成功對於香港的啟示和借鑒探索：
單車、游泳和跆拳道案例分析”

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Executive summary

行政摘要

(1) Abstract of the research

This research project aims to enhance Hong Kong's elite sport policy effectiveness and create a sustainable policy system for elite sport development in Hong Kong, through both an endogenous evaluation of the domestic elite sport system and the identification of weaknesses and problems, and an exogenous policy transfer process from one of the most successful elite sport nations and Hong Kong's former colonial ruler, namely the UK. Hong Kong's limited elite sport success, including its very sporadic Olympic medal performance and the failure to win any medal at the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games, is a main obstacle hindering the realisation of economic, political, social, cultural and diplomatic functions and utility of sport, despite the government's increased attention to and support for elite sport development in Hong Kong. Some nations' longstanding success and notable progress in recent years proffer possible formulas that work, and the UK is an illustrative example because of its (gold) medal success at London 2012 and beyond. The significance of the UK as a model for Hong Kong to learn was further elevated because of Hong Kong's colonial history and the concomitant far-reaching British imprint on sport in Hong Kong, and the former Chief Executive of Hong Kong's explicit expression that Hong Kong should learn from the UK for elite sport development during open media press immediately after Hong Kong's poor performance at Rio 2016. The concept of policy transfer is underpin this research.

This research employed the multiple case study approach and focus on three specific Olympic sports/disciplines, namely cycling, swimming and Taekwondo. Data was collected from both documents and semi-structured interviews, and qualitative data were subjected to thematic analysis. This research has filled a significant gap in Hong Kong, for the first time, evaluating

Hong Kong's existing elite sport policy, structure, system and strategy, and 'importing' policy and experience from a leading elite sport nation in the contemporary era. Policy transfer and policy implementation theory were used to analyse UK's elite sport policy. Based upon the results collected by the documentary analysis and interviews, short-term, and mid-to long-term recommendations are provided to enhance the elite sport performance of Hong Kong. It covers eight dimensions including organizational structure, financial support, talent identification and athlete development, coaching, training, competition opportunities, scientific research, and international influence. To conclude, a more comprehensive and structural strategy with timeframe is needed to synergize the efforts and resources from the elite sport stakeholders to make Hong Kong more successful in Olympic sport performance. As British Cycling emphasized that the aggregation of marginal gains is their winning edge, the strategic synergy of the key actors of Hong Kong elite sport will further strengthen our athletes' Olympic performance.

研究摘要

本研究旨在透過對本港精英運動制度的內生評估和弱點問題的識別，以及來自最成功的精英運動國家之一、香港前殖民統治者英國的外生政策轉移過程，提升香港精英運動政策的成效，並為香港精英運動發展建立可持續發展的政策體系。儘管政府日益關注和支持香港的精英運動發展，但香港精英運動的成績有限（表現在罕有的奧運獎牌的獲得，以及在2016年里約熱內盧奧運會上沒有贏得任何獎牌），是阻礙運動在經濟、政治、社會、文化和外交方面發揮作用的主要障礙。一系列國家的經驗能提供了一些非常值得借鑒的成功模式，英國就是一個典型的例子，因為它在2012年倫敦奧運會和之後的奧運會上都獲得了獎(金)牌。由於香港的殖民歷史以及英國對香港運動的深遠影響，進一步提升了英國作為香港學習榜樣的意義。這也符合香港在2016年里約熱內盧奧運會上表現不佳後，香港特首在電視直播中關於香港應該學習英國精英運動經驗的公開表述。政策轉移的概念是本研究的基础。本研究採用多重案例分析的研究設計，重點研究香港單車、游泳和跆拳道項目的政策。資料收集主要依靠文獻和半結構式訪談，並對定性數據進行專題分析。這項研究首次評估了香港現行的精英運動政策、結構、制度和策略，並「引進」了一個當代領先的精英運動國家的政策和經驗，填補了香港的一個重大空白。運用政策轉移理論和政策執行理論對英國精英運動政策進行了分析。根據資料分析及訪談的結果，本研究提供了短期及中期及長期的建議，以提升香港的精英運動表現。建議包括組織結構、財政支持、運動員選材、運動員發展、教練技術、訓練、競爭機會、科學研究和國際影響力八個維度。綜上所述，香港需要一個更全面和有時限的結構性策略，以配合精英運動的努力和資源，使香港在奧運運動中取得更好的成績。正如英國單車協會強調的那樣，邊際收益的總和是他們的獲勝優勢。香港精英體育主要界別的戰略協同，將進一步提升香港運動員在奧運上的表現。

(2) Layman summary on policy implementations and recommendations

Despite the government's increased attention to and support for elite sport development, Hong Kong has been demonstrating limited success in Olympic medal record. UK's notable progress and success in recent years proffer possible formulas that may act as a model for Hong Kong to learn. The present study analysed the elite sport policy of UK in the past decades and provided recommendations in eight dimensions. They are organizational structure, financial support, talent identification and athlete development, coaching, training, competition opportunities, scientific research, and international influence. To conclude, a more comprehensive and structural strategy with timeframe is needed to synergize the efforts and resources from the elite sport stakeholders to make Hong Kong more successful in Olympic sport performance.

研究項目對政策影響和政策建議的摘要

儘管政府對精英運動發展的關注和支持有所增加，但香港在奧運獎牌榜上取得的成績有限。英國近年來取得的顯著進展和成功，為香港提供了可供借鑒的模式。本研究分析了英國近幾十年來的精英運動政策，並從組織結構、財政支持、運動員選材、運動員發展、教練技術、訓練、競爭機會、科學研究和國際影響力這八個維度提出了建議。綜上所述，香港需要一個更全面和有時限的結構性策略，以配合精英體育的努力和資源，使香港在奧運運動中取得更好的成績。

Introduction

Elite Sport Policy: A Global Sporting Arms Race

The government's concern in elite sport achievement has been a major feature of sport development and public policy over the past two decades. As the most influential international sport event, Olympic Games has manifested its unparalleled global attractiveness, universal and ever-expanding tentacle and influence, which has transcended sport *per se* by leaving an indelible imprint on political, economic, social and diplomatic domains (De Bosscher, Bingham, Shibli, Van Bottenburg & De Knop, 2008; Toohey & Veal, 2007; Horowitz & McDaniel, 2014; Zheng & Chen, 2016). According to Grix and Carmichael (2012), governments' interest and concomitant investment is originated from the 'feel good' factors such as international image, national pride and identity, to motives such as increasing sports participation, public health and social cohesion (De Bosscher et al., 2008, p. 44). Elite sport achievement is a platform to demonstrate different ideology and its superiority (Green & Houlihan, 2005). As Houlihan (2011, p. 367) stated that elite sport success has become the 'irresistible priority' in many countries.

Contemporary Olympic success becomes more intensive globally and act like a sport arms race among the nations and regions (Oakley & Green, 2001b). This phenomenon has stimulated academic inquiry in the relationship between the elite sport success (i.e., medal winning) and the attributing factors including governance structure, financial support, training facilities, mass participation, talent identification system, coach development, scientific support and innovation, national and international sport competition structure, athlete post-career support, media and sponsors (De Bosscher et al., 2006). Due to the economic, political, social, cultural and diplomatic values of Olympic success, inquiry for the Olympic success has become a popular research focus internationally.

Elite Sport in Hong Kong

The ultimate goal of this research is to enhance the policy effectiveness of elite sport development in Hong Kong and boost Hong Kong's medal winning performances at the Summer Olympic Games, through policy evaluation of the *status quo* and policy learning from successful nations.

In fact, sport, in particular, elite sport and specifically Hong Kong's independent international sporting status, is an important manifestation and fruit of the 'One Country, Two Systems' principle, which plays an important role in bridging Hong Kong with Mainland China and the world (Ho & Bairner, 2013; Zheng, 2016). Elite sport plays a significant role in the government's agenda (Zheng, 2016). Bearing in mind elite sport success' utility in social cohesion as a custodian of local pride, its soft power value in contributing to Hong Kong's distinctive global identity (Ho & Bairner, 2013), and the image as an 'Asia's world city' (Tung Chee Hwa, previous Chief Executive of Hong Kong, 1999, quoted in Bridges, 2012, p. 661) and cultural hub, and its function of inspiring the younger generation. Hong Kong's Olympic medal record thus far is, to say the least, poor. The lack of progress in recent years is far from satisfactory especially given the substantial government investment and neighbouring National Olympic Committees' (NOC) notable, comparative progress (most notably Singapore and Chinese Taipei). Compared with its historical performance and traditional 'rival' nations in Asia, Hong Kong has become a laggard in elite sport development. More importantly, funding efficiency and effectiveness has been a hardy perennial puzzling elite sport in Hong Kong.

Despite the elevated policy salience of elite sport in Hong Kong since 2000, evidenced in the establishment of the Sports Commission (SC) and its affiliated Elite Sports Committee (ESC), and the increased government subvention to Hong Kong Sports Institute (HKSI) for elite training (from HKD105 million in 2005-2006 to HKD376.1 million in 2014-2015, HKSI, 2006, 2015) and concomitant support for elite athletes, Hong Kong has failed to achieve Olympic medal success. In addition to the intensified global competitiveness and hence rising global standards of achieving an

Olympic medal, deeper-level policy factors can hardly absolve themselves from the responsibility for this performance failure. Hong Kong is unsuccessful in both strategy and structure, and characterized by a very inefficient and ineffective investment approach. Yet, questions remain:

(1) To what extent is Hong Kong's elite sport strategy and policy unsuccessful both at the general level and for specific Olympic sport?

(2) Why are they unsuccessful? Can specific elements of the high performance system be identified as responsible following a measurable model and scientific approach?

(3) Is there a necessity to fine-tune Hong Kong's existing approaches to elite sport development? If yes, then how can Hong Kong remedy and refine its elite sport policies, mature its structure and perfect its strategy and talent identification and development system by integrating both Hong Kong's tradition and competitiveness, international trend and configuration, and leading nations' policy approaches?

These questions frame this analysis, which aims to comprehensively evaluate elite sport policy in Hong Kong for the first time, and more importantly improve its policy making and implementation by incorporating the policy learning and transfer from UK, one of the leading nations. In Hong Kong, Olympic sports are governed by corresponding National Sports Associations (NSAs). HKSI, as the stronghold of elite training and distributing government subvention to each elite sport, adopts a stratified system treating different sports/disciplines in a differentiated way regarding the salience and funding for these sports and disciplines. This is akin to the No Compromise Strategy and performance target approach in the UK. In this research, cycling, swimming and Taekwondo are selected for in-depth analysis:

Amongst these three sports, cycling has long been a prioritised sport in Hong Kong, contributing one of the total three Olympic medals to Hong Kong. As one of the 'Major Four' (Zheng, 2016, p. 329) sports/disciplines in Hong Kong, cycling, through its governing body of The Cycling Association of Hong Kong, China Limited (CAHK), receives substantial government

financial support. In addition to the medal achievement at the Summer Olympic Games, cycling has been a reliable source for Hong Kong delegation's (gold) medal performances at the Asian Games and the National Games of China. Cycling has contributed the largest number of gold medals (9 out of 30 at the Asian Games and 6 out of 8 at the National Games) to Hong Kong at both events, the significance of which far outweighed any other sport. However, it remains a thorny issue as to how to further enhance Hong Kong cycling team performance at the most important Summer Olympic Games, and to potentially render cycling a stable/sustainable source of medal performance for Hong Kong.

Swimming is an important foundation and gold medal-abundant sport at the Olympic Games, with 34 events available at a single Summer Olympic Games. It has traditionally been a popular sport for mass participation, and swimming's significance in the elite sport system of Hong Kong is also noteworthy, arguably one of the most significant non-Major sport disciplines. Hong Kong's Olympic debut at the Helsinki 1952 was achieved by four swimmers, the only sport discipline witnessed Hong Kong Olympic participation in 1952 and 1956. Moreover, Hong Kong has consistently participated in Olympic swimming competitions since then with the only exception of the boycott of the Moscow 1980 Summer Olympic Games. Despite the solid mass base, popularity and consistency in Olympic participation, Hong Kong swimming team performance at the Summer Olympic Games has been not desirable, without any top eight performances, let alone Olympic medals. However, inspired by the Olympic gold medal breakthrough of South Korea and Singapore in the last decade, swimming is assumed to be an area with considerable undiscovered medal potential for Hong Kong, if the delivery system for coaching, talent identification and development and training could be refined. Hong Kong elite swimmers' performance at the Asian Games has been notable, with ten medals won thus far (but no gold). Another encouraging sign was Siobhan Haughey's continuous outstanding performances in international swimming competitions. She won three bronze medals in women relays (4 x 100m, 4 x 200m freestyle, 4 x 100m medley relay) in 2014

Incheon Asian Games, two silver medals in Summer Youth Olympic in 2014, and a gold medal in the 100-metre freestyle at the World Junior Championships in 2013, and qualified for the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. She qualified for the final of the 200-metre freestyle at the 2017 Aquatics World Championships where she finished 5th and won the 1st runner up in women's 100m freestyle at the Budapest 2020 International Swimming League by breaking the Asian record (The Cover, 2020). Thus, how to enhance Hong Kong Amateur Swimming Association's (HKASA) policy making and implementation to fully realize the potential utility of swimming is an issue that this research aims to address.

In comparison, Taekwondo, despite its certain degree of popularity amongst young persons, remains peripheral at the elite level in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has not had any Taekwondo athlete qualified for the Olympic Games, and Taekwondo has not had contributed any medal to Hong Kong at either the Asian Games or the National Games of China. However, as a relatively young Olympic sport which was not included in the Olympic Games until Sydney 2000, Taekwondo provides a platform for many non-traditional nations (for example, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, UAE, and many neighbouring Asian regions such as Chinese Taipei and Vietnam) to achieve Olympic (gold) medal breakthrough. This sport may be a new source for Hong Kong to target for Olympic medal success, and Hong Kong Taekwondo Association (HKTA) and HKSI might be able to take actions to increase support for this currently largely neglected potential market.

Successful Elite Sport Policy 'Paradigm': The UK

The phase of endogenous policy evaluation is followed by policy learning and transfer from a successful nation of the UK, which is a more exogenous vehicle whereby Hong Kong can rationally fine-tune its elite sport policy. The UK, is selected because of its great success at the 2012 and 2016 Summer Olympic Games, recent Olympic host nation status, former HK Chief Executive's explicit intention and expectation, and 'selling points' regarding elite sport development that direct potential

for policy learning and transfer to Hong Kong based on Hong Kong’s colonial history and close link with the UK. Team GB made steady progress since Sydney 2000 and rose as a top elite sport nation from Beijing 2008, reaching the peak on the home Olympics in London in 2012 and more importantly sustained this competitiveness at Rio de Janeiro 2016, at which British elite athletes won even more medals than at London 2012 and overtook China as the second place in the gold medal table (see Table 1). Thus, the UK is eligible to be a ‘teacher’ for elite sport in Hong Kong to learn.

Table 1. Team GB’s medal performance at the Summer Olympic Games: Between Barcelona 1992 and Rio de Janeiro 2016.

Edition	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total	Medal Point	Position in the Gold Medal Table
Barcelona 1992	5	3	12	20	33	13
Atlanta 1996	1	8	6	15	25	36
Sydney 2000	11	10	7	28	60	10
Athens 2004	9	9	12	30	57	10
Beijing 2008	19	13	15	47	98	4
London 2012	29	17	19	65	140	3
Rio de Janeiro 2016	27	23	17	67	144	2
Total	101	83	88	272	557	5

Cycling, swimming and Taekwondo are successful elite sports in UK in the past decade. These three sports are governed by Great Britain-level governing bodies: British Cycling, British Swimming and British Taekwondo respectively, affiliated with UK Sport at the general level. For cycling, Team GB has won in total 26 gold medals between 1992 and 2016 Olympic Games,

including eight gold medals at Beijing 2008 and London 2012, and being the most successful cycling nation over this period, 12 gold medals more than the second successful nation of France. Cycling is the largest source of gold medals for Team GB, and its contributions to Team GB's recent success is unparalleled. In addition, British Cycling has been a model for many other sports to learn.

British Swimming has generally made notable progress since Rebecca Adlington's two-gold medal breakthrough in women's distance freestyle at Beijing 2008. The disappointing performance at London 2012 where British Swimmers failed to win any gold medal, despite substantial financial support, did not last long. At Rio 2016, British swimmers won one gold and five silver medals, ranking sixth in the swimming-specific gold medal and overtaking China (7th).

Taekwondo is an illustrative example of the successful story of a relatively new sport, which benefited from London's success in bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games in 2005. Previously, the UK only had one competitive Taekwondo player at the Olympic Games. Since Sarah Stevenson's medal (bronze) breakthrough at Beijing 2008, Team GB has become a stronger contender for Olympic medals in Olympic Taekwondo competitions, with one gold each (in total two) won at London 2012 and Rio de Janeiro 2016 (both by Jade Jones in women's 57kg). In addition, one silver and two bronze medals were won by British Taekwondo players at these two most recent Olympic Games. Concomitantly, the salience of Taekwondo in UK Sport has been elevated and its popularity amongst the general public also increased significantly. All these demonstrate that the UK is a valuable source nation for elite sport policy in Hong Kong at both the general level and for the three selected sports.

Theoretical Underpinnings

This research is underpinned by two theoretical frameworks/concepts:

- (1) Thesis on policy transfer adopted to identify successful experience and pathways of the UK in general and in the three selected sports, and critically, successfully 'import' these formulas

to Hong Kong;

- (2) Ten conditions for 'perfect' policy implementation deployed to identify the successful experience of policy implementation in these three sports in the UK and enhance policy implementation 'smoothness' in relation to elite sport in Hong Kong (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984).

Policy Transfer

Policy transfer refers to the process in which 'knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system' (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 5). Policy learning is a broader concept of policy transfer and can lead to both 'policy innovation or termination (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). There are three types of policy transfer: voluntary transfer, indirect coercive transfer and direct coercive transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Evans, 2009a; Evans, 2009b; Stone, 1999). Voluntary transfer is usually driven by the dissatisfaction, problem and/or uncertainty (for example, poor performance at the Olympic Games). Indirect coercive transfer is driven by externalities or technology such as doping detection and substances abuse from WADA. Direct coercive transfer is often caused by hegemonism and imperialism (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). In policy transfer, there are six categories: policy goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). Policy transfer, or transferability, is conditioned by factors such as the size and nature of the problem, the information available, past policy constraints, institutional and structural constraints and most importantly economic resources (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996).

The concept of policy transfer was deployed in this research to clarify and more importantly guide Hong Kong elite sport's learning process from the UK. This helps identify Hong Kong's

rationales and necessity to learn from the UK, the contents for Hong Kong to learn and underscores the conditions for successful learning and transfer according to which potential risks can be proactively avoided and prevented, and the learning could be more fruitful.

Policy Implementation

Policy implementation is to carry out the policy decision, usually take the form of important executive orders or court decisions (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). It consists of two prevalent implementation modes: top-down approach and bottom-up approach. Considerable effort has been made to improve policy implementation efficiency and effectiveness. Hogwood and Gunn's (1984) theory of ten conditions for 'perfect implementation' offers a 'formula' against which policy implementation can be evaluated and more importantly, based on which more efficient and effective policy implementation can be realized. While elite sport may represent a more satisfactory example of 'perfect implementation' as opposed to mass sport and school sport because of the elevated policy salience, increased government support and centralized approach of elite sport development in many nations. There is still a high degree of complexity and intractability to realize 'perfection' in policy implementation, even in China where elite sport has long been highly centralized and politicized. This illustrates the 'unattainability' of 'perfect implementation' (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984, p. 198) (see Table 2). Although this framework has been criticized for being idealistic and impossible to achieve (Hill, 1997), it is particularly useful in guiding the identification of 'bottlenecks' affecting smooth policy implementation in general and in each sport in particular, aiming to afford some solutions for a more 'harmonious' organizational relationship, and an enhanced implementation process.

Table 2. Conditions for 'perfect' implementation. (use this table for policy implementation suggestions)

Number	Conditions
1	That circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose crippling constraints.
2	That adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the programme.
3	That the required combination of resources is actually available.
4	That the policy to be implemented is based upon a valid theory of cause and effect.
5	That the relationship between cause and effect is direct and there are few if any, intervening links.
6	That dependency relationships are minimal.
7	That there is understanding of, and agreement on, objectives.
8	That tasks are fully specified in correct sequence.
9	That there is perfect communication and co-ordination.
10	That those in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance.

Sources: Hogwood and Gunn (1984, pp. 199-206).

Good policies do not necessarily imply successful outcomes, for which the ‘implementation gap’ often acts as a main culprit. This is particularly important for this research, because even though clear, rational and evidence-based elite sport policies can be made or improved after evaluating the status quo of Hong Kong elite sport and learning from successful nations. There is a risk of policy failure because of the ‘downgraded’ policy implementation. Therefore, this research adopts a two-pronged approach, focused on both policy making (based on policy evaluation and learning) and implementation.

Significance of the study

The policy relevance of the present research has four dimensions.

- (1) This research centres on a salient area of contemporary public policy – elite sport policy. Sport, in particular elite sport in Hong Kong, is an important manifestation and practice of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula. It plays an integral role in various policy aspects but the status quo is its multi-dimensional capacity in local economy, employment, tourism, social cohesion and local pride and Hong Kong’s soft power construction has not been fully capitalized, because of (a) a dearth of social science-centred elite sport policy research; and (b) Hong Kong’s limited elite sport success.
- (2) This research is underpinned by prominent public policy theories. These include internationally popular sport policy factors leading to elite sport achievement deployed for the assessment of the status quo of Hong Kong elite sport system and for the identification of the areas for policy refinement and reform, policy learning and transfer theory applied for Hong Kong to learn from successful nation (UK), and theories of policy implementation adopted in relation to the enhancement of policy implementation effectiveness.
- (3) This research, in nature, is a policy analysis involving at least three stages of a policy process: policy evaluation, policy implementation and policy making and refinement, with the possible necessity of policy remedy and reform following viable policy recommendations.
- (4) This research seeks to introduce and analyze elite sport policy approaches of a successful nation – the UK to inspire the local context. This necessitates a careful review and exploration of elite sport policy in UK, through documents in two languages: English and Chinese.

Objectives of the study

- (1) To review and evaluate elite sport policy effectiveness and the *status quo* of elite sport development in Hong Kong from the perspectives of both policy making and policy implementation, both at the general and sport-specific levels (cycling, swimming & Taekwondo);
- (2) To extract successful experience in policy making and implementation in these three sports in the United Kingdom (UK) and consider the transferability of practices and policies found in the UK to Hong Kong;
- (3) To provide recommendations on reconfiguring the elite sport landscape and government support structures in Hong Kong by exploring the potential utility of cycling, swimming and taekwondo in medal prospect for Hong Kong athletes in the future, with lessons and experience learnt from the British counterparts in the last decade to enhance financial efficiency and effectiveness in elite sport development.

Research methodology

This research employs a multiple case study approach. The case study emphasises that particular outcomes are generated in a particular context (Yin, 2009). This research applies a comparative case study (Carmel, 1999) to investigate successful nation's pathways to elite sport policy and development. Accordingly, three sports were selected in this present research: cycling, swimming and Taekwondo.

(1) Cycling is a priority sport in Hong Kong which has contributed Olympic medals and most Asian Games gold medals to Hong Kong. Equally importantly, from the perspective of policy transfer, the UK is the most successful nation in this sport (taking the seven most recent Summer Olympic Games together) and the contribution of cycling to the UK's recent rise in Olympic gold medal tally has been the most substantial compared to all other Summer Olympic sports.

(2) Swimming is an important foundation sport in both the HK and the UK. For Hong Kong, swimming is selected because it is one of the second most gold medal-abundant sport discipline at a single Olympic Games (34 events) and it is popular in Hong Kong with certain competitiveness in Asia traditionally and some progress on the international stage in recent years. However, the medal potential of swimming for Hong Kong elite sport success has not been fully stimulated, compared to other sports in Hong Kong and swimming in neighbouring nations and regions most notably Singapore. How to 'escalate' this competitiveness in Asia and recent progress in the final eight to an international level is part of the challenge this research seeks to explore. Swimming is a heavily funded sport in the UK. Despite a slight fluctuation at London 2012, British Swimmers have made notable progress in recent years, evidenced in in total three gold medals won at the Summer Olympic Games since Beijing 2008 and the establishment of a certain degree of group competitiveness in a range of events.

(3) Taekwondo is an illustrative example of a sport which developed from a relatively

peripheral area to a stable source of Olympic gold medal to Team GB since London 2012. The significance for Hong Kong is how can Hong Kong identify a promising sport with reasonable mass popularity and relatively open medal distribution at the Olympic Games which tends to be in favour of Asian nations, and whether it is necessary for Hong Kong to fine-tune its priority strategy by including some potential yet hitherto neglected sports.

Data Collection

(1) Documents (Printed and Website)

Documents are the major source of data for both Hong Kong and UK. In particular, because of the high difficulty, unpredictability and intractability in conducting interviews in particular in the UK because of the nature of elite sport policy as a sensitive issue against a contemporary background of the global sporting arms race and the UK's careful attention to the confidentiality of its approaches, documents play a significant role in understanding and analyzing elite sport policy in the UK, and to a lesser extent in Hong Kong.

In general, documents were accessed from (a) printed and online publications (including annual reports), and website information and news release of the central government, sport-related government departments, elite sport-related national governing bodies covering all Olympic sports, national Olympic committees, sport-specific governing bodies for the three selected sports, and influential local media, as well as existing research publications on elite sport in general and elite sport policy and development.

Hong Kong:

- Hong Kong SAR Government and Chief Executive Report
- Leisure & Cultural Service Department (LCSD), Home Affairs Bureau (HAB), Sports Commission and Elite Sports Committee in particular

- Sports Federation & Olympic Committee (SF&OC) (<http://www.hkolympic.org/>), HKSI (Annual reports and website information, <https://www.hksi.org.hk/>)
- Cycling Association of Hong Kong, China Limited (CAHK) (<http://www.cycling.org.hk/>), Hong Kong Amateur Swimming Association (HKASA) (<http://www.hkasa.org.hk/>) and Hong Kong Taekwondo Association (HKTA) (<http://www.hktkda.com/en/>)
- Media: iFeng, Ta Kung Pao, Wen Wei Po, Sing Pao Daily News, TVB, RTHK, HKTVE etc. (news and interviews with or open talks by government officials , sports officials, coaches and athletes, and support staff)
- Academic publications by Brian Bridges, Glos Ho, Patrick WC Lau, Jinming Zheng, etc.

The UK:

- The UK Government including Policy documents: *Sport: Raising the Game* (Department for National Heritage, DNH, 1995), *Lottery Fund Strategy, 1999-2009* (Sport England, 1999b), *A Sporting Future for All* (DCMS, 2000), *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), *Playing to Win: A new era for sport* (DCMS, 2008), *Creating a sporting habit for life: A new youth sport strategy* (DCMS, 2012) and *Sporting future: A new strategy for an active nation* (DCMS, 2015);
- Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-culture-media-sport>)
- UK Sport (<http://www.uk sport.gov.uk/>), Sport England (<https://www.sportengland.org/>)
- British Olympic Association (BOA) AND Team GB (<https://www.teamgb.com/about-boa>)
- British Cycling (<https://www.britishcycling.org.uk/>), British Swimming (<https://www.britishswimming.org/>), and British Taekwondo (<http://www.britishtaekwondo.org.uk/>)
- Media: BBC, The Times, The Telegraph, The Guardian, The Sky, The Sunday Times etc. (news and interviews with or open talks by government officials , sports officials, coaches and athletes, and support staff)

- Academic publications by Mick Green, Barrie Houlihan, Jonathan Grix, Ben Oakley, Simon Shibli, Ian Henry, Ian McDonald, Leigh Robinson, Vassil Girginov etc.

(2) Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews are carried out with key elite sport stakeholders including the chairperson, performance manager or equivalent positions and selected coaches and athletes of each NSA in Hong Kong. 19 interviews were conducted in Hong Kong, including nine from the government and general sports governing bodies including the HAB, LCSD, SF&OC, HKSI, SC and ESC, and 10 sport-specific interviews for three selected sports (director or deputy director of the three association, team leader/performance manager, head coach, one non-head coach and two athletes for CAHK, HKASA and HKTA). Nine interviews to the NSA coaches and athletes were declined due to personal reasons.

Due to the COVID-19, 18 interviews to UK stakeholders including the NSA chairperson, performance manager or equivalent positions and selected coaches and athletes of each NSA were constrained. As mentioned in the proposal, snowball strategy was planned to use to invite the stakeholders through personal contacts once the PI arrives UK in Loughborough University and University of Northumbria. A trip to UK was planned in the proposal. With my physical visit, I believe that it can maximize the feasibility to interview the UK stakeholders. The COVID-19 does not allow my travel as planned to conduct the snowball strategy. The projected number of interviews is an ideal plan as stated in the proposal. It is difficult to identify the exact number of interviews in advance due to the availability of interviewees, invitation strategy through snowballing and the potential difficulty in the UK for researchers from a rival nation/region. Nevertheless, there is substantial information available from policy documents (printed and online) of relevant sports governing bodies in the UK and from media because of the high degree of information transparency. In addition to the support of the UK research professors from Loughborough University and

University of Northumbria via email and Wechat interviews, these two interviews have provided significant opinions and information to further understand the UK elite sport policy based upon their expertise on this topic. Their input has compensated a significant gap of the study. Based upon their data, a comprehensive understanding of UK elite sport policy is achieved. Their input has offered an effective remedy for this issue and it is believed that no significant damage to the overall data analysis was induced. Of course, if all the UK interviews can be conducted, the study will be perfect. Interview questions were constructed on the research objectives and policy areas of this research, including financial support, organizational structure, coaching, talent identification and athlete development, domestic and international competition, post-athletic support, training, science and technology, international influence and representation, anti-doping etc. These themes are congruent with key policy factors leading to elite sport success identified and used by most elite sport researchers (for example, De Bosscher, De Knop, Van Bottenburg and Shibli, 2006; De Bosscher, De Bosscher, Shibli, Westerbeek and Van Bottenburg, 2015; Green & Houlihan, 2005; Tan & Green, 2008; Zheng, 2015). These systematically organized interview question design structured the subsequent thematic analysis. Snowballing strategy was adopted to maximize the interview numbers.

The duration of interview was between 30 minutes and 2 hours. Ethical approval was sought through the Senate Committee on the Use of Human and Animal Subjects in Teaching and Research, Hong Kong Baptist University before any interview. Copies of interview transcripts were provided to interviewees for verification and correction. To ensure the linguistic consistency and hence data reliability, a process of back translation was conducted after the researchers translate the Chinese material into English, before they are subjected to formal coding and qualitative content analysis.

Data Analysis: Thematic Analysis

Qualitative data, collected from both documents and semi-structured interviews was subjected to thematic analysis, which pertains to qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The

interview data was transcribed verbatim and coded for case analysis. Data was proof read and positioned into thematic categories, following which patterns and explanations in the themes are expected to be explored to identify any significant relationship between different themes. The final stage of the data analysis process was the 'selective' coding to extract explanations of concepts and information. Transcriptions was carefully checked against the recordings to identify any transcription errors, in an attempt to maximize the trustworthiness of the data (Stiles, 1993). To overcome the challenge regarding the interpretation of interview data, transcripts and interview materials were discussed with other researchers involved in this report to ensure the coherence between the data and themes (Devine, 2002; Sparkes & Smith, 2014).

Research results/findings

(1) British Sport Policy Status Quo

Historical Background of Britain Sport Policy

Sport has been an integral part of British culture for rather long period. The UK is regarded as the founders of a variety of contemporary and Olympic sports, such as football, tennis, badminton, boxing, hockey, cricket and curling. In the meanwhile, the relationship between the UK and the Olympic Games seems intimate. Britain's significant role in the progress of the integral Olympic movement can be reflected in another aspect that it is one of the only four countries which have participated every Games since Athens 1896 (both the Summer and the Winter Olympic Games). Furthermore, London has hosted the 1908, 1948 and the 2012 Summer Olympic Games.

There are four stages in the political context of the UK: 1965-1990, 1990-1997, 1997-2005 and 2005-2016. The real spotlight was shed on sport until the appearance of John Major in 1990s. It was until the mid-1960s that Sport emerged on the government's agenda as its responsibility (McDonald, 2011). Under Margaret Thatcher's tenure prior to the 1990s, sport was merely a 'lightweight' (Major, 1999, p. 404) government responsibility. A momentous change in the history of sports in the UK has

historically been recognized as the appointment of John Major as prime minister at the beginning of the 1990s (Green, 2004a; Green & Houlihan, 2004; Houlihan & Lindsey, 2013). The significance of sport has increased considerably in the cabinet and several steps led by the Government have been taken. Undoubtedly, the successful bidding of London for 2012 Summer Olympic Games has marked a new era for Britain's elite sport. Most recently, with the aid from the continuous policy support, Team Great Britain enjoyed its prime time in 2016 Rio de Janeiro when taking over China as the second place on the gold medal table.

Sport Policy since 1990

As stated by Phillpots, Grix and Quarmby (2010), the appointment of John Major as the Prime Minister in November 1990 marked a new era for the revival and resurrection of the UK's sports development. Though John Major inherited much of Thatcher's legacy in many way, two striking differences between them made his sport policy distinctive. Firstly, John Major was prone to advocate the nation's role in proffering aid to sport. Secondly, John Major was the representative of 'continuity, community and stability' (Kavanagh, 1994, p. 13). Together with his enthusiasm for sports, these personal values have led John Major to establish and encourage a more systematic approach to sport.

There were not many differences between the document *Sport and Active Recreation* (Department of Education and Science, DES, 1991) and Margaret Thatcher's sport policy, but three significant changes were representative after Major took the charge of the regime: the Department for National Heritage (DNH) was created in 1992; the National Lottery money was founded in 1994; and the policy document *Sport: Raising the Game* (Department for National Heritage, DNH, 1995) was issued in 1995. Furthermore, as supplemented by Houlihan and White (1992), at the national and social levels, the introduction of the National Lottery was appropriate to reflect the change of society and government's attitude towards sport. National Lottery funds have played a significant role to the development of sport in elite sport since it was introduced in 1994. The emergence of the National

Lottery reinforced the government's influence on sport policy making rather than losing control of sport policy affairs due to government's power to decide the criteria for distribution of the lottery fund.

With the publication of the remarkable policy document *Sport: Raising the Game*, elite sport and school sport came to the center stage for its contribution to 'national identity' (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2013, p. 36) and international relationships. Concomitantly, central government's and the GB Sports council's influence on mass participation sports have been weakened. In the Meantime, government made concerted efforts to bid to host international sports mega events. Despite the loss of Manchester's bid for the summer Olympic Games in 2000, the top priority of the UK's sports affairs was still bringing the Olympic Games to Great Britain according to the then-Minister for Sport (Sproat, 1995c). Though it was not happened during the period of John Major's reign, London's successful bid for 2012 Olympic Games could be traced and attributed to the policies formulated in John Major's tenure as the foundation of other following policies and regulations. According to Houlihan and White (2002, pp. 67-68), additionally, school sport and youth sport was entitled to the same significant status for its role as a 'ladder of progression', and exert functions during the process of talent identification. Observed by Houlihan and White (2002, quoted in Houlihan & Lindsey, 2013, p. 30), the influence on sport policy imposed by John Major was beyond his tenure.

The 'New' Labour commenced to govern since 1997 and its reign has lasted for 13 years. In Finlayson's (2003, p.66) perspective, 'modernisation' was the most accurate word to illustrate the meaning of Labour's project in the social and political aspects. Blair (1998) also agreed that the two most primary political purposes were to make the social more inclusive and modernise the government regarding the partnership principles and decentralisation when he was the Prime Minister. The Labour believed that sport was essential to a series of social issues which were thought not related to sport including social welfare (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2013).

Even though the sport strategy conducted by the John Major's Government was generally consistent with the Labour government, there were some outstanding advantages during the latter's period. Briefly speaking, Green and Houlihan (2005, p. 59) insisted that 'modernisation' and 'professionalism' played an increasingly important role in achieving welfare aims including social inclusion and more opportunities for all. Even though welfare aims such as social inclusion attracted significant concerns and penetrated the most of the public policy areas (Collins, Henry & Houlihan, 1999), they had different meanings and in terms of sport, the priority was given to elite sport success other than welfare aims. Shaw (2004) suggested that another distinctive feature during Tony Blair's era was the increasing centralisation. Specifically speaking, the government kept a closer eye on UK Sport and the relationship between the government and voluntary sport organisations (NGBs and their affiliated clubs) developed from a trust to a contract (Houlihan and Lindsey, 2013). When Blair became the Prime Minister, his government took advantage of the 'Best Value' concept to show the determination to pursue modernisation. 'Best Value' aimed at modernising public services such as sport and leisure services (Sport England, 1999a). The promotion of this initiative also complied with the 'Third Way' which was one of the political philosophies for the Labour (Giddens, 1998).

The government had adopted more practical policies from 1999. Firstly, the development goals of both local projects for all and elite sport success were proposed as the Sport England document, Lottery Fund Strategy, 1999-2009 was published (Sport England, 1999b). Also, the two categories of financial support: Community Projects Fund (£150m) and World Class Fund (£50m) were taken into action. As Green (2004a, p. 372) suggests, this was further proof of government's determination in supporting elite sport development. Secondly, the elite sports institute network was developed by the Labour Government. For example, in 1999, the UK Sports Institute (UKSI), which was the specialist elite network centres, was put into use (Theodoraki, 1999), which facilitated elite sport success with a series of advanced resources such as coaching, medical and sport science. Moreover, it should not

be neglected that Lottery funds regarded UK Sport as a distributor in the same year. According to the Elite Sports Funding Review (DCMS, 2001a), the government developed a three-tier (Performance, Potential and Start) World Class Lottery Fund scheme in order to support elite athletes more efficiently and comprehensively. Green and Houlihan (2005, p. 59) pointed that the two fundamental cornerstones beneath the UK's emergent elite sport development model were UK Sports Institute (UKSI) and National Lottery funding.

A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000), the policy statement, generally complied with *Sport: Raising the Game* which is the previous policy statement. It implicated that although the previous government had emphasised the importance of sport, the Labour government regarded it as a much more practical instrument. Moreover, according to *A Sporting Future for All*, the government intended to establish more Specialist Sports Colleges (SSCs). As a result, the government funded around 400 Specialist Sports Colleges, and they would act as the cradles for elite athletes (Green & Houlihan, 2005, p.60). The statement also implicated that the performance targets decided the NGBs funding and planning documents were required (Green, 2004b). Therefore, due to the implication of *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), the elite sport started to launch and strengthen a results-driven and evidence-based approach afterwards.

Three prime ministers from two parties took turns being in charge of the Downing Street during the period 2005-2012. London was awarded the right to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in 2005 in Singapore. Since then, as McDonald (2011, p. 379) argued, high-performance sport has secured its 'hegemonic' position within the sports policy domain at the sacrifice of the development of other forms of sport. The then Labour Government viewed hosting the Olympic Games as a platform for a variety of policy concerns such as strengthening national pride, social integration and East London regeneration. As Houlihan and Lindsey (2013) stressed, 'the decision made by the IOC in July 2005 to award the right to host the 2012 Olympic Games provided significant political legitimation for policy decisions taken over the previous decade to prioritise elite

sport development'. Under such circumstances, the Tony Blair government and his Labour successor Gordon Brown have taken various measures to respond to the changes.

First, in 2005, There has been a restructure of sports organisations, including DCMS, UK Sport, Sport England, National Governing Bodies and the Youth Sport Trust. Second, the World Class Performance (WCP) programme directed by UK Sport since 1997, has become an ever more critical tool to ensure the success of elite athletes on home soil in 2012. (UK Sport, 2012). To be more specific, in this programme, sports were divided into three different levels on the basis of the likelihood of medals being won and when they will be delivered at the Olympic Games (see details in Figure 1). At the first level which is called 'Podium', those who are certified as competitors with high likelihood to win a medal at the forthcoming Olympics will be provided with full support (London 2012). Athletes classified into the sequence of 'Podium' were always prioritised. Normally, 'Podium' athletes were able to get support and aid from the NGB by way of the WCP programme. However, they can find funding or grants from other outlets. For instance, the Athlete Personal Award contributes a maximum of £26,142 to 'Podium' athletes per year (McDonald, 2011, p. 380). At the second level which is named as 'Development', targeted athletes were those who were considered to have reasonable chances of obtaining (gold) medals for the next Olympic cycle (Rio de Janeiro 2016). At the third level which is known as the 'Talent Identification and Confirmation', targeted athletes were those who were in need of six or more years before they could meet the standard of 'Podium'. It is well noted that these three levels do not exclude each other. It is worth noting that these three levels are not mutually exclusive. Prior to 2012 London Olympic Games, lots of former 'Development' players were improved to join the 'Podium' level (National Audit Office, NAO, 2008).




Figure 1. UK Sport's World Class Performance programme Source: UK Sport (2012a).

During Gordon Brown's tenure, the most remarkable sport policy document should be the *Playing to Win: A new era for sport* (DCMS, 2008). The government's instrumentalist view towards community sport did not change with community sport being viewed as a tool serving elite sport development and ensuring medal success in high-profile sports events in relation to talent identification and development (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2013). In striking contrast to community sport in the document, the priority of elite sport was strongly emphasised through several clear goals, such as breaking records, winning medals and tournaments for the country.

During the Gordon Brown's Premiership, the elite sport boosted and gradually occupied the hegemonic position. Burnham (2008) implicated that the final purpose of sport was the performance. While he got the support from the government with the slogan 'No compromise' funding policy. No one can deny that it is merciless strategy which determines the allocation of funds based on the number of medals. Therefore, some NGBs would suffer the financial cuts since they failed to achieve the medal targets in the next preparation cycle of Olympics. However, the coalition government had

replaced the Labour party in May 2010 before Gordon Brown realised his manifesto of ‘a golden decade of sport in Britain’ (The Labour, 2010).

‘Big Society’ is the most accurate word to conclude the essence of policy of David Cameron’s coalition government, with the idea of developing community and voluntary associations to weaken the power of government. Even though in *The Conservative Sports Manifesto* (Conservative Party, 2010) the government admitted the importance of sport, the position of sport was inevitably influenced by the notion of ‘Big Society’.

According to *the Comprehensive Spending Review of October 2010*, the budget was cut for the DCMS, authorities and quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (quangos) including UK Sport and Sport England. Moreover, the government required UK Sport and Sport England to merge for decreasing the budget and the number of quangos. Nevertheless, the David Cameron has compromised because of the London Olympic Games. The elite athletes who would participate the London Olympics Games were promised to equip with necessary financial support. Judging from the facts, the coalition government still agreed with the heavy budget in elite sport. In Addition, the plan concerning the merger of UK Sport and Sport England was delayed and finally never come true.

Creating a sporting habit for life: A new youth sport strategy (DCMS, 2012), the latest government sports strategy, raised the concerns on the increase in the sports participation level. One of the features was focusing on the youth people from 14 to 25, with the notion that it would be a long-term goal to achieve a change in participating sport. It can be noticed from the statement that the current government also paid attention to the grass-roots sport. Nevertheless, it would be too early to come to the conclusion that this strategy would impose a long-term effect on the development of sport.

Based on the success of the previous strategic plan issued by UK sport prior to 2012 London Olympics which resulted in the repercussion made by the Team GB in 2012, Mission 2016 and 2018 aiming at better medal performance at Rio 2016 was established in the aftermath of Olympics on the

home soil. The Mission 2016 and 2018 tools were based on a thorough review of the structure and function of Mission Control. Apart from the general plan for better preparation for 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games, emphasis was placed on the development of the overall financial plan for 2013-17 to determine the scope of funds available for the World Class Programme. According to the annual report published by UK Sport (2013), the new version of the World Class Programme was finalised, in which £355m was spent on summer sports over the next Olympic cycle. To elaborate, investment on coaching, research innovation and athlete development were given primacy accordingly. Furthermore, more specific points regarding to preparation for Rio 2016 were proposed by UK Sport as followed:

the establishment of a Performance Intelligence function within UK Sport to help us target both investment and activity to have maximum impact:

- a new way of working with our subsidiary the English Institute of Sport to support world class technical service provision; the launch of a Master coach programme to develop the very best, world-leading coaches within the UK;
- the need to create systemic growth of the Paralympic environment; and
- a demonstrable step-up in the standards of leadership and governance to drive sustainable success.

The medal performance of Team GB at 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games with exceeding China and ranking second to the US proved the practicality of the UK's Olympic strategy and related supportive policies.

Government Funding Support

During the period from 1990 to 1997, though John Major's enthusiasm for and attention to sport was exuberant, the essential support from him for sport was limited which was a common gripe as 'rhetorical' (Holt & Tomlinson, 1994, p. 457; Talbot, 1995, p. 7). Concerning with the rationality, the

financial support from the Foundation for Sports and Arts (FSA) (introduced in 1991) and Sportsmatch scheme (launched in 1992) was insufficient. When the money from the National Lottery was allocated to sport in 1995, doubts about John Major's inefficient support for sport vanished accordingly. Sufficient fund from National Lottery grants has been poured into the development of sport since then, among which elite sport has been one of the main beneficiaries.

During John Major's tenure, funding from government were poured into the GB Sports Council constantly, though the latter could not avoid the fate of reconstruction. Statistics during this period is illustrated in the following table.

Table 3.1. Grants to the GB Sports Council, received from the government between 1990-1991 and 1996-1997

Year	Grant
1990-1991	£42,600,000
1992-1993	£47,600,000
1994-1995	£49,800,000
1996-1997	£47,400,000

A proportion of the government funding the GB Sports Council obtained was allocated to elite sport, the detailed numbers of which is provided in the following Table 3.2. In an objective perspective, during this period, a stable increase in the funds distributed to elite sport from Sport Council grant could be witnessed.

Table 3.2. Funding (estimates) for elite sport from the GB Sports Council between 1990-1991 and 1996-1997

Year	Amount	Proportion of total GB Sports Council grant allocated to elite sport
1990-1991	£16,623,751	39.02%
1991-1992	£15,776,352	-
1992-1993	£14,196,606	29.82%
1993-1994	£18,082,704	-
1994-1995	£19,960,115	40.08%
1995-1996	£21,837,597	-
1996-1997	£7,539,140	15.91%

Coming to the period from 1997-2005 under the premiership of Tony Blair, there have been many distinct changes in the funding environment for sport in Great Britain. Firstly, according to the information proffered in the above, since 1999, UK Sport has become the principal taking charge of the allocation of National Lottery funds. Secondly, two main funding sources were committed in the *Lottery Fund Strategy*, which were Community Projects Fund (£150m) and World Class Fund (£50m) in respective. Moreover, in 2000, *A Sporting Future for All*, as government guidance document, related NGB funds to the goals of elite sports performance. What is worth mentioning, a milestone in creating a more effective and efficient financial environment for the development of elite athletes was the birth of the three-tiered (Performance, Potential and Start) World Class Lottery Fund scheme. Apart from the athlete-related funding schemes, coaching-related services involved with funds were introduced as well.

Since the appointment of Tony Blair as the Prime Minister, compared to the numerical statistics in the era of John Major, there has been a surge in the amount of financial supply for the development of sport in general and elite sport in particular. According to Table 3.3 below, there was a sharp increase in the amount of funding for elite sport development since Tony Blair became the

Prime Minister in comparison to that in John Major era (see Table 3.3). Although the total amount of funds allocated between the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games and 2004 Athens Olympic Games is roughly the same, the funds distributed to elite sports during the Athens Olympics preparation cycle have significantly greater fluctuations.

Table 3.3. Funding (estimates) for elite sport from UK Sport between 1997-1998 and 2004-2005

Year	Amount
1997-1998	£42,935,000
1998-1999	£42,935,000
1999-2000	£48,726,000
2000-2001	£37,144,000
Sydney Olympiad	£171,740,000
2001-2002	£70,856,000
2002-2003	£29,295,000
2003-2004	£18,618,000
2004-2005	£47,829,000
Athens Olympiad	£166,598,000

Source: Zheng (2011, pp. 176-177).

Compared to the investment in elite sport within the 2000 Athens Olympic preparation cycle, a surge in funding for the Beijing Olympiad was witnessed (see Table 3.3 and 3.4). The increase in funding could be attributed to the fact that the New Labour government was inclined to make good use of taxpayer's money to accomplish sports missions in general and Olympic medal objectives in particular, especially after London secured the right to host summer Olympic Games in 2012 on its home soil. It is shown in Table 3.4 that the UK Sport's annual investment on elite sport hit historic

highs, exceeding £200 million, in 2012-2013.

Table 3.4. Funding for elite sport from UK Sport between 2005-2006 and 2012- 2013

Year	Amount
2005-2006	£110,958,000
2006-2007	£85,988,000
2007-2008	£83,415,000
2008-2009	£113,655,000
Beijing Olympiad	£394,016,000
2009-2010	£167,476,000
2010-2011	£90,586,000
2011-2012	£76,534,000
2012-2013	£203,787,000
London Olympiad	£538,383,000

Note: Formula: Grant-in-aid: (Grants and Other Operating Costs) + Lottery Funds: (Hard Commitments - Hard De-Commitments). Staff costs are not considered. Sources: UK Sport (2012b; 2013b); Zheng (2011, p. 178).

Medal Winning Desire (Olympic Performance)

The performance of the UK Olympic delegation in Barcelona 1992 maintained a stable level which could be regarded as a continuation of normal performance since 1964 Tokyo Olympics. However, the UK met its ‘Waterloo’ in Atlanta 1996 with disastrous medal performance (ranking 36th in the gold medal table with only one gold medal).

After the ‘unusually poor Olympics’ (McDonald, 2011, p. 371) in Atlanta 1996, the UK went back on track in Sydney 2000 and returned to the upper half of the gold medal table with 11 gold medals.

Furthermore, in the Centennial Olympic in Athens in 2004, team GB basically maintained the same level of competition as the last Olympics.

Team GB embraced remarkable success in Beijing by ranking fourth position in the gold medal table with 19 gold medals. With the strong momentum of success achieved in Beijing 2008, the UK Olympic delegation made still further progress on its home soil in 2012 London Olympic Games. When the final curtain fell, the host secured 29 gold medals out of 65 medals in total with ranking 3rd in the gold medal table by overtaking another traditional Olympic competitor - Russia. However, the magical performance of Team GB continued in 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games, ranking 2nd place in the medal table, only second to the US, was the best Olympic (gold) medal performance in the UK's history. The detailed information on Team UK's achievement at Olympics is illustrated in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5. The UK's medal tally and position in the medals table in Olympic Games since Tokyo 1964

Edition	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total	Position in the Gold Medal Table	Position in the Total Medal Table
Tokyo 1964	4	12	2	18	10	9
Mexico City 1968	5	5	3	13	10	13
Munich 1972	4	5	9	18	12	10
Montreal 1976	3	5	5	13	13	11
Moscow	5	7	9	21	9	7

1980						
Los Angeles	5	11	21	37	11	5
1984						
Seoul	5	10	9	24	12	9
1988						
Barcelona	5	3	12	20	13	12
1992						
Atlanta	1	8	6	15	36	19
1996						
Sydney	11	10	7	28	10	9
2000						
Athens	9	9	12	30	10	10
2004						
Beijing	19	13	15	47	4	4
2008						
London	29	17	19	65	3	4
2012						
Rio de Janeiro	27	23	17	67	2	3
2016						

Sources: International Olympic Committee (IOC) (2020).

The key actors in the UK elite sport policy

British Olympic Association (BOA)

BOA is the National Olympic Committee (NOC) for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It is responsible for selecting the best elite athletes to form 'Team GB' who will represent the UK to strive for medals in the 33 summer and seven winter Olympic sports.

There are two distinctive roles that have been played by the BOA. Firstly, instructing and training the finest athletes for the summer, winter and youth Olympic Games. In collaboration with the NGBs, 'Team GB' is constituted with the best athletes all over the country selected by the BOA to compete in the 33 summer and seven winter Olympic sports at the greatest sporting competition in the world. **Secondly**, the BOA is committed to the development, promotion and protection of the Olympic Movement in the United Kingdom abiding by the Olympic Charter. The BOA is an independent organisation with private fund, which does not obtain financial subsidies from the lottery or the government. Additionally, the BOA is not possessed with any political intention. The success of our mission is dependent on the revenue we generate from fundraising and events, so it is a strong, independent voice for the British Olympic Games.

Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)

As a move of upgrading and modernising sport and leisure services, the DCMS was born as the successor of the Department for National Heritage (DNH) with the same responsibility for sports affairs at the government level. In addition, DCMS has also dealt with the development of sound strategies for the organisation of sports mega events in the UK (DCMS, 2013).

National Governing Body (of Sport) (NGB)

A National Governing Body (NGB) is an organisation that governs and administers a sport on a national basis. Traditionally NGBs are viewed as the guardians of their sport. An NGB is expected to deliver the following functions:

- (1) Develop and regulate the environment, members and organisations of its sport;

(2) Administer the practice and participation of its sport.

To deliver the functions, a Recognised NGB is likely to organise the following activities:

- (1) Prepare and implement a vision and strategic plan for its sport;
- (2) Manage anti-doping, child protection and equality;
- (3) Establish links with the UK/Ireland and the international governing bodies;
- (4) Develop coaches, athletes, officials and participants;
- (5) Organise and host competitions.

UK Sport

Since the recently systematical restructure of sports organisations led by New Labour after London acquired the right to host the 2012 London Olympic Games in 2005, UK Sport has become the most important agency within the domain of elite sport by taking over responsibilities from Sport England.

UK Sport provides strategic investment to enable Great Britain's Olympic and Paralympic sports and athletes to achieve their full medal winning potential. UK Sport investment and support services cover:

- (1) Performance (Investment, Evaluation, Solutions);
- (2) Events (Investment, Bidding, Support);
- (3) International (Influence, Development);
- (4) Governance, Leadership, Financial Accounting;
- (5) Science, Medicine and Technology (via the Home Nation Institutes).

The English Institute of Sport (EIS)

EIS provides support and services to improve sporting performance. More than 400 renowned experts in sport science, medicine, and technology help athletes achieve their full potential. Established in 2002 and funded by UK Sport, the EIS works with Olympic and Paralympic sports to

achieve success. At the Rio 2016 Olympic & Paralympic Games, the EIS worked with 93% of the athletes and 31 of the 34 sports that won a medal for Team GB and Paralympics GB.

EIS works with coaches and performance directors to help athletes excel by optimising training programmes and maximising performance.

(2) Hong Kong Sport Policy Status Quo

Historical background of Hong Kong sport policy at a glance

The development of Hong Kong elite sport has enjoyed a long period from the infancy of sport during 1842 to 1950 to further expansion after the 1997 handover. Before the 1950, the characteristic of Hong Kong sport was deeply influenced by the colonizers or the Britons who introduced crickets, tennis, football, swimming and other sports that popular in the UK to Hong Kong. Sport at that time, was a way of recreation to the colonizers and the then government showed little interest in sport promotion. The creation of Amateur Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong' (ASF&OC) in 1951 marked Hong Kong sport development entering a new era. Hong Kong became a delegation of Olympic Games and made its debut at the Helsinki 1952 Summer Olympics. ASF&OC not only selected athletes to take part in Olympic and Asian Games, but also promoted sport among the public. However, elite sport developed slowly compared to mass sport because of lacking government support. To resolve social turbulence and release energies of the young people in the 1970s, the Council for Recreation Sport (CRS) was founded by the government in 1973 as the one and only sport governing body at that time. The creation of CRS implied that sport had been elevated to the government's policy agenda. In addition, a donation of HK\$3 million was distributed to the Governor to establish the Sir David Trench Fund for Recreation for the provision of recreational, sporting, cultural and social activities and this fund became the first fund that aimed to encourage the young to do sport. In 1990 the CRS evolved to Hong Kong Sports Development Board (HKSDB) which was a quasi-governmental organisation that in charge of the overall sport development and

funded by the government. The two councils which were the Urban Council and the Regional Council were responsible for mass sport development such as leading sports activities in communities and operating local sports facilities. The elite sport was charged by Jubilee Sports Centre (JSC) which was founded in 1982 and later upgraded to Hong Kong Sports Institute (HKSI) in 1991. During this period Hong Kong won its first Asian Games gold medal in 1986 and its first Olympic gold medal in Atlanta in 1996. Although a notable progress of Hong Kong elite sport was made, the main feature of elite sport was amateurism and its significance to the government was still limited.

Sport policy after 1997

Having returned to Chinese sovereignty as a Special Administration Region (SAR) under the 'One Country, Two Systems' formula, Hong Kong sport development entered a new chapter. The main reason behind that was the interest in and support for sport in general and elite sport in particular of the new SAR government. The sport governing bodies underwent major structural reforms. Home Affairs Bureau (HAB) was established in 1997, which is responsible for sport and leisure, recreation and culture and youth development in Hong Kong at the government level (Ma, *The General History of Chinese Sports*; Patrick W. C. Lau and Eric C.H. Chan, 'A Comparison of Australia, Singapore & Hong Kong Sport Policy', *Asian Journal of Physical Education & Recreation* 18, no. 1 (2012): 58-75.). In general, the HAB oversees 'the overall formulation and implementation of sports policies, coordination of strategic planning of sports and recreational facilities, and decisions on the related funding allocations' (Home Affairs Bureau, 2014 Policy Address: Policy Initiatives of Home Affairs Bureau (Hong Kong: Home Affairs Bureau, 2014).). The two councils were dismissed in 1999 whose tasks were taken over by Leisure and Cultural Services Department (LCSD), a branch department of HAB, established in 2000. The major responsibilities of LCSD are to develop and manage sports and recreation facilities in communities for the public and promote school sport and physical education

among the students working with the Education Bureau (EDB). HKSDDB was dissolved on 1 October 2004 because of the overlap of responsibilities with LCSD and later Sports Commission (SC) was established as an advisory organization in 2005 to proffer suggestions on policies, strategies and funding plans to the government. Under the SC established the Community Sports Committee (CSC), the Elite Sports Committee (ESC) and the Major Sports Events Committee (MSEC). The objective of CSC is to promote sport for all; ESC's aim is to foster high-performance sports; and the MSEC's major job is to equip Hong Kong to host international sport events. The direction of Hong Kong sport development is more explicit. HKSI has been incorporated into HKSDDB in 1994 and became the only delivery agent of the government to implement elite sport policies in 2004 with the disbanding of HKSDDB. HKSI, funded by the government, is the headquarter and fortress of elite sport development by providing a high-quality training environment and comprehensive support services to elite athletes including training support services, dual career support and retirement support. In 1999, the ASF&OC changed its name to SF&OC (Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China) due to the permission that professional athletes could take part in Olympic Games. The major responsibilities of SF&OC are to send elite athletes to major sports events such as Olympic Games and Asian Games, promote Olympic movement to the public and initiate programmes to further career of retired athletes. In summary, the five organisations comprise the entire governing system and are the most influential in sport development in Hong Kong. As Lau and Chan's (2012) concluded, the general framework and structure of sports organisations and interactions between different associations within Hong Kong is mapped out (see details in Figure 2), which can better showcase the working process in Hong Kong sport administration.




Figure 2. Hong Kong Elite Sport Development Structure

Source: Lau and Chan (2012, p. 68)

Note: Currently, the official name of the House Affairs Bureau in this figure is Home Affairs Bureau.

Government funding support

The government's support to elite sport in particular can be reflected by the increasing investment. In 1997, Arts and Sport Development Fund (ASDF) was established by an injection of HK\$300 million by the government. As a sub-fund under the Sir David Trench Fund for Recreation, the objective of ASDF is to help HKSDB to accomplish its objectives of developing Hong Kong sport. The recent fund approved by the government in January 2019 was the allocation of HK\$1 billion into the sports portion of the ASDF to strengthen the funding support for sports organizations to train athletes and host sport events.

The HKSI is also funded by the government. The funds are growing annually from the initial HK\$ 95.8 million in 2004-2005 to HK\$ 266.4 million in 2011-2011. It is worth noting that the government changed its fund allocation to the HKSI in 2011 by establishing a HK\$7 billion Elite Athletes Development Fund (EADF) to provide a stable, long-term source of funding. In 2018-19, over \$590 million was allocated to the HKSI from the EADF by the government, which is far more than that of 15 years ago. In January 2019, the government has additionally injected HK\$6 billion to the EADF.

The national sport associations (NSAs) also receive funding from the government through Sports Subvention Scheme (SSS) administered and managed by LCSD. The funding is mainly utilised by each NSA to support sports programmes such as international events, training programmes and development schemes. The NSAs used to obtain funds from HKSDDB before 2005 and then received subvention from LCSD till now. In 2019-2020, 60 NSAs receive funds by SSS and the amount differs ranging from approximately HK\$ 1.2 million to over HK\$18 million (Jianping Guo, Hao Zhang and Jingguo Chen, 'Policy Research on the Development of Elite Sport in Hong Kong since the 'One Country, Two Systems'', *Contemporary Sports Technology* 8, no. 19 (2018): 180-1.).

The government also funds the hosting of major sports events. In 2004, the 'M' Mark System was launched by the MSEC to enhance the NSAs' capacity for hosting mega international events. Under the 'M' Mark System, more than HK\$100 million was allocated to the organizers of the 'M' Mark events in the last decade and the number of the events increased from four at the very beginning to 14 events in 2019 (Ta Kung Pao. 'Beijing won the bid for the Olympic Games', Ta Kung Pao, <http://www.takungpao.com.hk/life/238149/2019/0512/286918.html>/(accessed 28 February 2019)). 'Major Sports Events Matching Grant Scheme' was set up to encourage sponsorships from business and private sector. The government allocated HK\$500 million in 2019 to update this scheme, aiming to attract more sponsorships.

Medal winning desire

Since the handover in 1997, Hong Kong has continued to participate in international sports events including the Olympic Games in the name of Hong Kong, China. After winning its first gold medal at the Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games, Hong Kong has won another two medals at the 2004 and 2012 Olympic Games respectively. Li Ching and Ko Lai-chak, winning Hong Kong's first silver medal in table tennis at the 2004 Olympic Games. Lee Wai-sze won a bronze medal in women's keirin at the 2012 London Olympic Games. Although some achievements made at the Olympics, the medal winning capacity is sporadic, one medal every eight years against the government's involvement and investment. The Hong Kong people missed the smell of an Olympic gold medal so much.

Besides Olympics, Asian Games become the stage for Hong Kong athletes to make progress and achievements. Since Bangkok 1998, Hong Kong has won at least one gold medal at each Games and Hong Kong made a breakthrough in Jakarta 2018 by winning 46 medals in total and eight of them were gold medals.

After the handover in 1997, Hong Kong stopped participating in the Commonwealth Games but send athletes to compete in the National Games of China. After Wong Kam-po won the first gold medal in 1997 Shanghai, Hong Kong has won at least one gold medal at every National Games.

The key actors in the Hong Kong elite sport policy

Home Affairs Bureau (HAB)

HAB is committed to promote the sport development in Hong Kong. The Recreation and Sport Branch is responsible for the promotion and implementation of community sports, elite sport and major international sports events. HAB also increases sports and recreation facilities, and enhances a strong sport culture through the encouragement of community collaboration in Hong Kong (extracted from https://www.hab.gov.hk/en/policy_responsibilities/sport_policy/sport_policy.htm).

Below are the mission and vision of HAB, which relates to Hong Kong's elite sport development.

- (1) enrich life through supporting and promoting the development of the arts, culture, sports and recreation, preservation of cultural heritage and beautification of the environment;
- (2) promote professionalism and excellence in leisure pursuits and cultural services;
- (3) promote synergy with sports, cultural and community organizations in enhancing the development of arts and sports. (extracted from https://www.hab.gov.hk/en/about_us/vision.htm)

Elite Sports Committee (ESC)

ESC was established in 2005 under Sports Commission (SC) as an advisory organization to provide suggestions on elite sport policies, strategies and funding plans to the government. Below are the role and visions of ESC to enhance elite sport.

Role: To advise the Secretary for Home Affairs (SHA) through the SC on matters pertaining to high performance sport, provides policy direction to the HKSI, and advises on funding priorities for supporting high performance sport and athletes. (extracted from https://www.hab.gov.hk/en/policy_responsibilities/Recreation_Sport_and_Entertainment_Licensing/sport.htm)

Vision: To develop a cadre of high performance athletes who can compete in major

international and overseas sports events competitively, and become role models for youth. (extracted from <https://www.sportscommission.hk/eng/vision.htm>)

Hong Kong Sports Institute (HKSI)

The HKSI provides financial support to lifestyle support to elite athletes. The extent of individual elite athlete's support depends on their sport achievements and performances in competitions. Elite Athlete Support Scheme (EVSS) has been employed to identify the high-performance sports, which could be the legitimate recipients of the support. Based upon the EVSS, two tiers are categorized --- Tier A and Tier B. The prerequisite of Tier A sports are sports contested at the Olympic or Asian Games. Among Tier A sports, athletes have the potential to win medals or get into top eight at the Olympic Games are positioned as 'Tier A*' sports. 'Tier A*' sports would receive additional support from the HKSI. Four sports are categorized as Tier A* sports (i.e., badminton, cycling, table tennis and windsurfing). 16 sports are categorized as Tier A sports (i.e., athletics, billiards, equestrian, fencing, gymnastics, karatedo, rowing, rugby sevens, sailing, skating, squash, swimming, tennis, tenpin bowling, triathlon and Wushu) and 13 Tier B sports. The financial support consists of three types: Elite Training Grant (ETG), Sports Aid Grant (SAG) and Individual Athletes Support Scheme (IASS). 107 outstanding athletes and athletes with disabilities in Tier A sports and remarkable individual athletes who do not pertain to Tier A sports are beneficiaries of ETG. Elite athletes of other sports which are not supported under Tier A sports or IASS will enjoy SAG. Junior athletes and potential athletes can also receive support from HKSI such as ETG and local training support respectively. In addition to diversified financial support, scholarship athletes would receive other services and supports including training and competition support and education and lifestyle support. The specific services for elite athletes are listed below.

Types of Support and Services Available at the HKSI for Elite

Type of Support / Services 支援/服務項目	Category of Athletes 運動員類別	Tier A Sports Scholarship Athletes A級精英項目獎學金運動員			Other Elite Athletes 其他精英運動員	
		Elite/Junior/ Secondary Student 精英/青少年/中學生		Potential 潛質 (+10hr/wk 每週10小 時+) (For Tier A only (只適用於A級精 英體育項目))	IASS Athletes “個別精英運動 員資助計劃” 運動員 (Note 1)	SAG Athletes 體育訓練資助 運動員
		Full-time /Cat. 1 全職 /類別一	Part-time /Cat. 2 非全職 /類別二			
Financial Support 財政資助						
1	Direct Financial Support Schemes to Athletes 對精英運動員的直接財政資助					
	a) Elite Training Grant 精英訓練資助	✓	✓		✓	
	b) Elite Training Grant with Disabilities 殘疾人精英訓練資助					
	c) Sports Aid Grant 體育訓練資助					✓
	d) Sports Aid Grant for Athletes with Disabilities 殘疾人體育訓練資助					
	e) Individual Athletes Support Scheme (Programme funding) 個別精英運動員資助計劃 (訓練經費)				✓	
2	Hong Kong Athletes Fund 香港運動員基金					
	a) Education Grant 教育資助	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	b) Elite Athletes Performance Recognition Scheme 精英運動員優秀表現嘉許計劃	✓			(Full-time athletes only 只限全職運動 員)	
3	Incentive Awards for Major Games 優秀運動員獎勵計劃	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
4	Outstanding Junior Athlete Awards 傑出青少年運動員選舉	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
5	Elite Athlete Subsidy Scheme 精英運動員資助計劃	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Training and Competition Support 訓練及比賽支援						
6	Coaching 教練	✓	✓	✓	✓ [±]	
7	Local Training 本地訓練	✓	✓	✓	✓ [±]	
8	Overseas Training and Competitions 海外訓練及比賽	✓	✓		✓ [±]	
9	Equipment / Sports Gear 運動裝備 / 用具	✓	✓		✓ [±]	

Athletes

Type of Support / Services 支援/服務項目	Category of Athletes 運動員類別	Tier A Sports Scholarship Athletes A級精英項目獎學金運動員			Other Elite Athletes 其他精英運動員	
		Elite/Junior/ Secondary Student 精英/青少年/中學生		Potential 潛質 (+10hr/wk 每週10小時+) (For Tier A only (只適用於A級精英體育項目))	IASS Athletes “個別精英運動員資助計劃” 運動員 (Note 1)	SAG Athletes 體育訓練資助 運動員
		Full-time /Cat. 1 全職 /類別一	Part-time /Cat. 2 非全職 /類別二			
10	Insurances (package 1): Accident, Travel, Life and Medical Insurance 保險(計劃 1): 意外、旅遊、人壽及醫療保險	✓	✓		✓	
11	Insurances (package 2): Accident, Travel and Life 保險(計劃 2): 意外、旅遊及人壽			✓		
12	Use of Training Facilities Available at HKSI 使用體院現有的訓練設施	✓	✓	✓	✓	
13	Meals 膳食	✓	✓		✓*	
14	Sports Science / Sports Medicine 運動科學 / 運動醫學	✓	✓		✓	
15	Strength and Conditioning 體適能訓練	✓	✓	✓ (Note 3)	✓	
Athlete Education and Lifestyle Support 運動員教育及生活支援						
16	Athlete Development Programme 運動員發展計劃	✓	✓	✓	✓	
17	Education / Personal Development Guidance 教育/個人發展輔導	✓	✓		✓	
18	Tutorial Support 學習支援	✓	✓		✓	
19	Elite Athletes Continuing Education Subsidy 精英運動員進修資助	✓	✓		✓	
20	Lam Tai Fai College Partnership School Programme Admission Application (Senior Secondary Education) 林大輝中學夥伴學校計劃入學申請 (高中教育)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (For Tier B Sports only 只限B級精英項目)
	English Schools Foundation Partnership School Programme Admission Application (Senior Secondary Education) 英基學校協會夥伴學校計劃入學申請 (高中教育)	✓			✓ (Full-time athletes only 只限全職運動員)	
21	Nomination for Admission Application to Universities with MOU with HKSI 提名申請報讀已與體院簽署合作備忘錄之大專院校	✓			✓ (Full-time athletes only 只限全職運動員)	

Type of Support / Services 支援/服務項目	Category of Athletes 運動員類別	Tier A Sports Scholarship Athletes A級精英項目獎學金運動員			Other Elite Athletes 其他精英運動員	
		Elite/Junior/ Secondary Student 精英/青少年/中學生		Potential 潛質 (+10hr/wk 每週10小時+) (For Tier A only (只適用於A級精英體育項目))	IASS Athletes “個別精英運動員資助計劃” 運動員 (Note 1)	SAG Athletes 體育訓練資助 運動員
		Full-time /Cat. 1 全職 /類別一	Part-time /Cat. 2 非全職 /類別二			
22	Athlete Hostel 運動員宿舍	✓			✓ (Full-time athletes only 只限全職運動員)	
23	Social / Welfare Activities / Programme for resident athletes 宿舍社交/福利活動	✓			✓	
24	Elite Coaching Apprenticeship Programme 精英教練工作體驗計劃	✓				
25	Car parking at HKSI 體院停車場	✓	✓	✓	✓	

Note 1: IASS = Individual Athletes Support Scheme: Athletes of Olympic/Asian Games or Paralympic/Asian Para Games Sports, who are not supported under Tier A sports and achieve Point 3-level or above according to the Elite Vote Scoring Table, are eligible to receive an annual programme funding (through the respective NSAs) to support the items marked with an “ * ” above.

Note 3: Potential Athletes can only use the Strength & Conditioning facilities under a structured programme agreed and supervised by sports specific Coaches and Strength & Conditioning Coaches

Ref of the table above

Table 4. Direct financial support to athletes

Year	Total: HK\$ (Million)	No. of Athletes
18-19	114.6	1128
17-18	101.8	1074
16-17	89.08	963
15-16	79.46	874
14-15	69.31	810
13-14	60.44	799
12-13	49.56	692
11-12	53.16	731
10-11	48.78	699

Training support: Training facilities include an indoor Sports Complex for badminton, billiard sports, fencing, karatedo, squash, table tennis, tenpin bowling and wushu, alongside integrated sports facilities for athletes with disabilities, an Athletic Field, an international standard indoor Swimming Complex, a Rowing Centre and Tennis Courts. Off-site facilities are also provided for other Tier A sports to cater to specific training needs. (extracted from

https://www.hksi.org.hk/annual-report/2018-19/f/upload/56/AnnualReport18_19.pdf)

Coaching Support: Hong Kong Jockey Club Coach Education Programme (HKJCCEP) is funded by The Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust since November 2015. The programme aims to ensure the quality of sports to enhance the long-term elite sport performance in Hong Kong. The HKJCCEP has three programmes: the Jockey Club Elite Coaching Development Programmes, the Jockey Club Coaching Accreditation Programmes, and the Jockey Club Community Education and Coach Recognition Programmes. In 2018/19, a total of 2,368 coaches benefited from the HKJCCEP. (extracted from https://www.hksi.org.hk/annual-report/2018-19/f/upload/56/AnnualReport18_19.pdf)

Sports science support: Six centres (Scientific Conditioning Centre, Sport Biomechanics & Technology Centre, Sport Nutrition Monitoring Centre, Sport Psychology Centre, Sports Medicine Centre and Sports Information and External Affairs Centre) under the Elite Training Science & Technology Division provide different evidence-based training/solutions with the coaches for the athletes' performance enhancement. Its support covers the strength and conditioning training, physiological testing, skill and motion analysis, nutrition strategies and counseling, mental skills training, sport visits and exchange, and rehabilitative training.

Talent identification: Talent Identification & Development (TID) Programme was established in 2013. The programme intends to provide an environment and nurture those young and potential athletes approach to elite athletes through the four levels (Foundation of participation, Talent, Elite and Mastery). The TID Programme works with NSAs to identify talented athletes and track their development, and ultimately lead them to the elite athlete level. Their services include Talent Development Program, Talent Testing Program, Sports Specific Program, Joint Talent Development Camp.

Besides financial, lifestyle, training, coaching and sports science support, athletes could also enjoy academic support through the Memorandums of Understanding signed by the HKSI and nine local universities and 27 local secondary schools (Hong Kong Sports Institute, ‘Criteria and Guidelines’, Hong Kong Sports Institute, [https://www.hksi.org.hk/f/page/53/Criteriandguidelines\(20Oct202017\).pdf/](https://www.hksi.org.hk/f/page/53/Criteriandguidelines(20Oct202017).pdf/) (accessed 12 September 2019).). The universities and secondary schools provide flexible arrangements for the full-time athletes and the student athletes. Currently, the support provides to 1,300 elite athletes at the HKSI, including 500 full-time athletes. HKSI offers support to retired athletes through the Athlete Development Support Programme. Retired athletes learn life skills and coaching skills through this program so they can transit to their second career. Retired full-time athletes can also apply a one-off bonus through the Elite Athletes Performance Recognition Scheme (EAPRS). Below are the mission and vision of HKSI.

Mission

HKSI commits to work with the Government, the Sports Federation & Olympic Committee of Hong Kong (SF&OCHK), China and the National Sports Associations (NSA) to provide an environment in which sports talent can be identified, nurtured, and developed to pursue excellence in the international sporting arena.

Objectives

To provide an environment in which talented Hong Kong sportsmen and sportswomen have the opportunity to achieve at the highest level in sport and advancement in sports education;

To be a delivery agent in the provision of high performance sport for talented sportsmen and sportswomen in Hong Kong, under the policy direction of the Secretary for Home Affairs, enabling them to achieve international success so as to enhance the reputation of Hong Kong and benefit the

community of Hong Kong;

To formulate and prepare schemes for and establish and take all necessary steps for the promotion, maintenance, improvement and advancement of the interest of the public in Hong Kong and elsewhere in elite sports and various related forms;

To work closely with the SF&OCHK and NSAs or other organizations of similar nature in the education, training and developing of Hong Kong talented sportsmen and sportswomen to achieve success in major games and international sporting events;

To work closely with the NSAs and other bodies in the identification of talents for elite sports training;

To co-operate with different sectors of the community, education and sports training institutions, both local and in other places, in the delivery of elite sports training programmes;

To assist athletes under training in the Institute in their education and vocational training and their longer term personal and career development;

To provide sports science and sports medicine services to elite athletes and coaches, catering for the needs of the athletes undergoing their sports training programmes;

To facilitate and sponsor elite sport-related research and studies; and to educate, disseminate knowledge and advice on these matters to the sports community for the enhancement of high performance sport;

To provide sports information service to meet the needs of athletes, coaches, national sports associations, physical education specialists and sports science and sports medicine professionals;

To provide coach education and development, coach accreditation and coach registration;

To promote the exchange of information, experience, international understanding and goodwill in elite sport education and training. (extracted from

<https://www.hksi.org.hk/hksi/vision-mission-values>)

Vision

To become the region's elite training systems delivery leader by providing state-of-the-art, evidence-based, elite sports training and athlete support systems resulting in sustainable world-class sports results. (extracted from <https://www.hksi.org.hk/hksi/vision-mission-values>)



Figure 3. HKSJ Elite Athlete Support

Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China (SF&OC)

In 1999, the ASF&OC changed its name to Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China. The major responsibilities of SF&OC are to send elite athletes to major sports events such as Olympic Games and Asian Games, promote Olympic movement to the public and initiate programmes to further career of retired athletes. Below are the missions of SF&OC.

To promote public interests in sporting activities in Hong Kong, through the organization of various sports events and competitions, to achieve a healthier lifestyle;

To encourage and reflect public opinions in requesting government to provide proper and

better facilities for the practice of all sports;

To reconcile or arbitrate in any differences which may arise between national sports associations or groups therein;

To coordinate all local sports organizations in the promotion of sports at different levels from leisure to elite, to attain the ultimate goal of “Sport for All”;

To work in conjunction with other global and regional organizations dedicated to the promotion of international competitions;

To foster Olympism, which promotes friendship, solidarity and fair play through sports;

To undertake the organization of international competitions and to support Hong Kong athletes’ participation in them;

To select and send Hong Kong, China delegations to all multi-sports Games, including the Olympic Games and Asian Games; and

To carry out what is necessary to attain the above goals. (extracted from <https://www.hkolympic.org/about-us/goals-and-missions/>)

National Olympic Committee (NOC)

NSAs are local governing sports organizations in different sports disciplines and its aim is to promote local sports and participate in international sports competitions. They affiliate to the international or Asian sport federations and act as the sole official representatives for their respective sports in international competitions. Currently, there are 79 NSAs under SF&OC. Below are the roles of NSAs.

To promote and develop sports in Hong Kong;

To select and train team members for representing HK at international events;

Raise the standard of play by organizing local, international competitions. (extracted from <https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/ha/papers/ha0113cb2-772-4-e.pdf>)

(3) Three elite sport events case analysis3.1 British Cycling**Introduction**

British cyclists had never turned up ever since 1904 until St. Louis Olympic Games, witnessed their winning first Olympic gold medal in London 1908 (SR, 2014h). They had suffered a long depression in the duration of the 1920s to 1980s, and it was a time when they achieved no Olympic gold medals. Excluding the two-bronze medals in Atlanta 1996, the achievement made by British cyclists was more than one gold medal covering the whole five Games in 1992-2012 (SR, 2013p; 2013q; 2013r; 2013s; 2013t). It marked a fresh age for British elite cycling in 2008 in which British cyclists went through Beijing, as they gained eight out of the eighteen gold medals, starting their dominant establishment of on the international stage. London 2012 witnessed the dominance when British cyclists achieved eight gold medals on their homeland. According to Table 5.1, Great Britain has been ranking the most triumphant cycling nation among the six latest Olympic Games. In comparison to other Summer Olympic sports, cycling, which lives up to be an honor TeamGB incomparable should be the primarily chosen source of medals for TeamGB (see Table 5.1 above).

Table 5.1. The UK's medal performance in cycling between Barcelona 1992 and London 2012

Edition	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total	Medal Points	Ranking
Barcelona 1992	1	0	0	1	3	4
Atlanta 1996	0	0	2	2	2	12
Sydney	1	1	2	4	7	6

2000						
Athens	2	1	1	4	9	3
2004						
Beijing	8	4	2	14	34	1
2008						
London	8	2	2	12	30	1
2012						
Total	20	8	9	37	85	1

Note: Medal points = the number of gold medals \times 3 + the number of silver medals \times

2 + the number of bronze medals \times 1.

Sources: Sports Reference (SR) (2013o; 2013p; 2013q; 2013r; 2013s; 2013t).

Organisational Structure

As the only authorized representative of British cyclists in the UCI and European Cycling Union, British Cycling (BC), which serves as the national ruling body for cycling in the UK (British Cycling, BC, 2009a; 2014b), has the membership of BOA. (European Cycling Union, UEC, 2014; UCI, 2014a). British Cycling, which has the prior fame as the British Cycling Federation (BCF), was set up in 1959 based on the amalgamation of the National Cyclists Union (NCU) and the British League of Racing Cyclists (BC, 2005a; 2014c). August 2001 witnessed the renaming of the BCF as the BC, and since then it has been the recipient of Lottery funding (UK Sport, 2001c).

As declared by the official strategy for 2013-2017, the BC takes it as the target ‘succeed on the world stage, to inspire more people to enjoy riding their bikes more often, be it for sport, recreation or transport’ (BC, 2013h, p. 11; 2013i). That is the demonstration that elite sport success and mass participation, which constitute the double advantages the BC, are deemed to be of mutual dependence (BC, 2013h; 2014d). The BC’s current Chief Executive Ian Drake (2013, quoted in

BC, 2013h, p. 4) announced, 'British Cycling is now well-established as the leading sports governing body in this country'.

Nonetheless, it was a bitter task for the BC to achieve its success in performing an efficiently functional sports governing role. The prevalence-based amateurism, along with the lacking-elite mechanism is considered to be the dominating barrier which hinders the promotion made by the British elite cyclists ushering on the international stage (for example, pointed out Peter King and Peter Keen, quoted in BBC Sport, 2008b; Golf Club Management, 2012). Besides, it is a critical turning point for the merit sport in Britain's integrated less satisfying performance in the year 1996 of Atlanta, particularly and generally in UK and in Britain.

That managed to upgrade the BC' organizational revolution. in according with the summarization of executive director of the BC Peter King (2012, quoted in Golf Club Management, 2012), 'It lives up to the best chance to build your remodeled business when being at the rock bottom and standing against the wall.' Coupled with the brief interpretation to the National Lottery, a range of actions had been committed to enhance the organizational structure, with the background of the modernization executed by British sports governing bodies. UK Sport and national sports ruling bodies saw the formation of a growing resource-oriented relationship, the BC included. Identical with the BG and the BS formerly known, the BC has been evolved to be an elite-pushed organization of more profession. Brian Cookson took the chair of the BC's president in 1997 (British Cycling Federation, BCF, 1997; BC, 2013b).

Financial support

National Lottery made a great contribution to the growth and prosperity of elite cycling in the UK (BBC Sport, 2008b), according to the confirmation of six-Olympic-gold winner Sir Chris Hoy, admitting the indispensable role of the National Lottery in achievement (UK Sport, 2014m). As a matter of fact, touted as the most successful Olympic sport in the UK during the past ten years,

cycling is ever treated as a prioritized member of UK Sport concerning funding distribution during the 21st century. Table 5.2 below expresses that, funding has risen in the Beijing Olympiad, which was more than £20 million on the contrary £8.6 million for the past Athens Olympiad. Funding is always upgrading on the basis of UK Sport's policy of 'No Compromise': a 17.5% enhancement from the Beijing Olympiad to the London Olympiad; in addition to a 17.4% increase from the London Olympiad to the Rio de Janeiro Olympiad. A newly highest culmination was made on the funding for British Cycling for the Rio de Janeiro Olympiad when it went beyond £30 million. As a close follower of rowing, cycling has been grown to be a current trend and the second largest recipient of Lottery funding (BBC Sport, 2012c; 2012d).

Table 5.2. Funding received by the BC and its predecessor the BCF from UK Sport and its predecessor GB Sports Council from the Barcelona Olympiad to the Rio de Janeiro Olympiad

Olympiad	Figure
Barcelona Olympiad	£1,468,105
Atlanta Olympiad	£2,116,275
Sydney Olympiad	£5,400,000
Athens Olympiad	£8,600,000
Beijing Olympiad	£22,151,000
London Olympiad	£26,032,000
Rio de Janeiro	£30,565,816
Total	£96,333,196

Note: Funding figure for the Atlanta Olympiad is estimated, as official annual reports are inaccessible.

Sources: GB Sports Council, annual reports, various years between 1990 and 1996; UK Sport, annual reports and financial statements, various years between 2000 and 2013; UK Sport (2011a;

2014a; 2014b); Zheng (2011, p. 180).

The WCP programme is billed as a dominant area which attracts funding investment. Until May 2012, 85 cyclists had been added to the WCP Performance Programme (UK Sport, 2014m). In addition, UK Sport is also financially supporting Gold Event Series, which includes the 2012 Track Cycling World Cup in Glasgow; besides, the then succeeded bid 2016 UCI Track World Championships in London (UK Sport, 2012d; 2013e). In accordance with the BC (2014f), from 2007 to 2013, UK Sport is a good provider of more than £2 million who offered 15 cycling events. More than that, the BC harbors a good many private partners, which include Sky, Adidas, Madison, Fiat, etc..(Adidas, 2013; BC, 2013j; 2014e; The Telegraph, 2012a).

Talent Identification and Athlete Development

In spite of the late emergence, the talent system is ever developing at an amazing speed in British Cycling. A wide string of generic talent projects have been committed by UK Sport, thus profiting a big cluster of sports, elite cycling included. The World Class Start and Potential Programmes are billed as the best known examples. The duration of 2001-2003, for instance, went through a drastic promotion among the young riders who attended the preliminary stage of the Programmes. Exceptionally, the number of riders recognized by the Talent Team had to go under strict control (see Appendix 12). UK Sport's talent-focused campaigns most specifically Girls4Gold provided a lot of talent young athletes for the British Cycling squad (UK Sport, 2008b; 2014f). Started in June 2008 in cooperation with the EIS, Girls4Gold was seeking for female sporting talent and the future Olympic champions for London 2012 and beyond in six sports, cycling included (UK Sport, 2014n; UK Sport & EIS, 2014). The female-concentrated project make up the UK Sport's deliberate attempted endeavor for achieving higher success in female events throughout a number of the UK's male-ruled 'fortress' sports (including cycling, rowing and sailing).

The BC has formed its specific well-rounded talent identification and athlete development mechanism, composed of four inter-dependent and hierarchical projects: Olympic Talent Programme, Olympic Development Programme (ODP), in addition to Olympic Academy Programme (OAP) and Olympic Podium Programme (OPP) (BC, 2013f; 2014g). Table 5.3 illustrates more detailed information of the four programmes.

Table 5.3. British Cycling’s four Olympic programmes

Programme	Full-Time or Part-Time	Scale and Form	Age Group	Level of Athletes
Olympic Podium Programme	Full Time	Nationally based	Mostly over 23	Riders considered to be world class with a strong palmares
Olympic Academy Programme	Full Time	Nationally based (generally near Manchester Headquarters)	Typically based 18-23	Riders with clear potential to be future champions
Olympic Development Programme	Part Time	Nationally based (Usually camp-based)	Typically between 16-18	Riders who are still in education

Olympic Talent Programme	Part Time	Regionally- based Talent Development Programme	Typically between 13-16 for the Talent +Development Programme	Young riders with a talent for cycling and ambition for success; Highly skilled youth riders typically between 14-16 for the Olympic Talent Team
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Sources: BC (2013f; 2014g; 2014h; 2014i; 2014j; 2014k)

The Olympic Talent Programme marks the preliminary step oriented with the hopeful young riders and commit to the BC's World champion 'production line'. It is comprised of two projects: the region-based Talent Development Programme and the Nation-based Olympic Talent Team Programme. Regarding the first one, Go-Ride club perform the duty of trainings nominate hopeful young cyclists by attending Regional Schools of Racing (RSRs) and National Schools of Racing (NSR) which are run by Talent Development Programme trainers. Besides, Go-Ride Games are conducted oriented with young riders from Go-Ride clubs in order for participating cycling (BC, 2014l). In practice, Go-Ride, the BC's fundamental programme for attracting young people to the orientation cycling based on providing a platform with an improved skills (BC, 2013l), is a good contributor to the fostering of elite cycling in the UK ever since its being launched in 2004. On a yearly basis, nearly 30 new talented riders, who immigrate into the National Talent Programme from the Go-Ride scheme (BC, 2014f). London 2012 Olympic champions Jason Kenny and Laura Trott makes for the best remarkable representatives of Go-Ride graduates (BC, 2013k) received nurturing from the Talent Team Programme (BC, 2012d). at present, over 60% of riders riding along the way

to Rio de Janeiro 2016 prove to be the graduates from Go- Ride clubs (BC, 2013k).

The Olympic Talent Team Program, in the funding support of Sport England (BC, 2003, p. 13), has been regarded to a 'precursor to the Olympic Development Programme' under the domination of the BC's Talent Team Performance Manager Gary Coltman (quoted in BC, 2012d). It is targeting identifying the hopeful young riders at the age of 14-16 by providing access for them to top-level training as well as other resources (BBC Sport, 2008a). Training camps are formed and set up, oriented with the well-chosen young riders and detailed support, on the basis of the provided assessment. Performance of the specific domestic youth and senior-degree competitions make up the major standard in choosing the cyclists for the entry to the Talent Team (BC, 2014h). Unlike the Talent Development Programme, the Talent Team Program highlights talent development instead of talent identification (Gary Coltman, 2011, quoted in BC, 2011c). Riders recognized to have latent capability will be pushed to the Olympic Development and Olympic Academy Programmes (BC, 2004; 2005b). According to the summarization of the CEO of the BC Ian Drake in the 2012 National Council Meeting (BC, 2012a), British Cycling's elite success gains its consolidation from Go-Ride and Talent Team.

The contribution made by the Fast Track Programme under the construction of the BC in 2006 should be paid attention to. The Fast Track program, covering its service throughout the four Olympic Programmes from Talent to Podium, worked hard for identifying and recruiting talented athletes out of the scopes including other sports, universities, the army and other non-conventional venues. The commitment aims to assist them to realize a smoothly rapid transition to competitive cycling (BC, 2006a). The most remarkable example, Olympic gold medal cyclist Rebecca Romero, is billed as an Olympic rowing silver medalist in Athens 2004 (SR, 2014i). It boasts a policy innovation on the BC in terms of the source of talent identification- recruitment. The establishment of the Fast Track program, in a large scale, was motivated by the upsurging medal anticipation resulting from the BC's achievement in Athens 2004 as well as London's bid for 2012 Olympic

Games in 2005. Nevertheless, talent transfer, a 'quicker' approach to recruitment and cultivation of sports talent, has never been regarded as a long-term strategy by Ian Drake, who is the CEO of the BC; another former senior official of the BC, who witnessed the foundation of a big grass-roots foundation at the club level. From that, as a safe foundation, young talent is likely to have a natural emergency in virtue of effective development procedures and paths (quoted in Houlihan & Chapman, forthcoming 2015).

The Olympic Development Programme was started in 2005. Training programmes are provided based on the fact that the chosen riders take pleasure in one-on-one training. Endurance riders are given the opportunity to have a race in Europe (BC, 2014i). Aiming to ensure the quality, ODP riders has to be go under strict control in number. ODP cyclists mark an achievement in not only Junior World but also European Championships (BC, 2007). At the Olympic Academy Program, cyclists must be work in full time, and accommodate in apartment-style residence in Manchester (BC, 2007) based on seven-day training on a weekly basis. A large number of the OAP riders have made progress in the ODP. Despite that, the OAP should not be essentially defined as a 'closed door' program, the reason is that it is still having chances in store talented cyclists who have other background (BC, 2014j). It is worth mentioning that the OAP harbor a pounding track bias, which mirrors its Olympic medal-centred philosophy (BC, 2014j). Those triumphant the OAP graduate step into professional teams or the Olympic Podium Program (BC, 2009a). Cyclists in the Podium Program bring in shape the senior GB Cycling Team (BC, 2014k). Their prime assignment is to be awarded with medals in main international competitions (BC, 2014k). The then Performance Director of the BC Dave Brailsford (2010, quoted in Bevan, 2010) emphasized, 'we will just look at the Olympic disciplines and where we are at in those in relation to the rest of the world'. Executive Director of the BC Peter King CBE made an accurate encapsulation on the ethos of the GB Cycling Team in the following:

'Our programme is centralised, focused and uncompromising. We aim for medals and nothing

less. We coined the expression ‘Podium Programme’, now adopted across all Olympic sports, because fourth is not good enough. Unlike some sports, we do not target making the final or getting into the top ten. It's medal or nothing. Our focus is not on 40 plus athletes as the UK Sport formula would permit but on 22 or 23, being the only ones we assess to be capable of winning an Olympic medal’. (Peter King, 2012, quoted in Golf Club Management, 2012)

In essence, the prioritisation of Olympic success and the creation of the ‘Podium Programme’ stood by the BC’s contribution to the overall UK elite sport landscape. Quite a number of Olympic sports, encouraged by British Cyclists’ enormous successes on the international stage, have acquired and absorbed a vast range of the BC’s approaches. The occurrence of the performance-driven strategy and the adoption of the Podium Program on many Olympic sports could be taken as an example of both voluntary policy learning and transfer conducted by other Olympic Sport NGBs (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996) as well as mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

A noteworthy increase has been witnessed in the BC’s interest and investment in BMX during the past ten years the last decade. The reality has been obviously mirrored in the BC’s BMX-specific talent programs (UK Sport, 2007a), the construction and the opening of the £24m National BMX Centre in Manchester, which represents World’s first indoor BMX center (BC, 2009d; 2011b) and the establishment of British Cycling BMX Talent Team at the imminent end of 2009 (BC, 2009e). In response to the IOC’s approval of partial BMX events in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games in 2003 (People.com.cn, 2003a), the BMX squad have set higher priority in the duration of the Beijing and London Olympiads (BC, 2006a). The BC (2006a, p.34) interpreted the following in its annual report, ‘the BMX programme adapts to the way the sport is structured, and as the participants adapt to the demands of life as elite athletes with the goal of an Olympic medal. The BMX riders have been offered some exciting opportunities, including taking part in Track sprint training camps alongside the more experienced Olympic competitors. Staffing and resources support for this still-evolving squad will be high as the Olympic Programmes enthusiastically embrace the considerable talent we

have in this area’.

The analogous changes have been committed on adaptation to the enlarged number of female events and meanwhile decreased male events from London 2012, which target the new Omnium and women’s team events, and reflected in the BC’s ‘vision for women’s cycling’ campaign (BC, 2010a, p. 8; Slater, 2013). The two examples expounded the effects exerted by the external factors - the IOC and UCI’s decision in regards to Olympic event-setting on British Cycling, as Houlihan stressed (2009).

Despite no evidence of cash rewards as award Olympic gold medal cyclists, top cyclists, which include Sir Chris Hoy, Sir Bradley Wiggins and Victoria Pendleton, have been exposing attraction to the sponsors (ChrisHoy.com, 2014; Fordyce, 2013; Road Cycling UK, 2010; The Pan-Arabia Enquirer, 2012). As for non-material rewards and social honors, a large part of Olympic cycling champions have been given the title of whether OBE or MBE. Chris Hoy and Bradley Wiggins respectively became the awarded Knighthoods in 2009 and 2013 (BC, 2013c; 2013d). Victoria Pendleton, was the representative of female cycling, were entitled CBE in 2013 (BC, 2013a). Moreover, cyclists ranked the third, out of the six latest BBC Sports Personality titles during 2008 and 2013 (BBC Sport, 2013g). Generally speaking, all of the honors are reflecting the high status and the popularity which belong to cycling and top cyclists in the UK.

Training

A world’ leading-age training set-up contributes another key contributory factor to the BC’s recent success (Cycling Weekly, 2009). A variety of policy instruments is always accepted by the BC as the regulator on cycling coaches’ conducts at both the National Squad and club levels, aiming to foster competition-based home grown coaches. Of the three policy instrument types summarized by Houlihan and Lindsey (2013), it is a more often occurrence that education and information and rewards tend to be utilized by the BC primarily in virtue of the specific Coaching and Education

Department (BC, 2014d). These examples are comprised of Regional Coaching Plan, Continuing Professional Development (CPD), Go-Ride Coaching Activity Programme, Coaching 2012, and other coaching courses or academic events (BCF, 1995; BC, 2003; 2009f; 2012f; 2014l; 2014m). Established in the early 2000s, Regional Coaching Centres aim to offer structural support to coaches and riders on the regional level (BCF, 2000). When it comes to inducements and rewards, regional and national funding, based on bursaries or grants, expresses availability for coaches throughout each area in Britain (BC, 2014o). Nowadays, coaching in cycling is under the regulation of the Level 1-3 qualification, certificate and award system (BC, 2014o).

Furthermore, the BC is also a beneficiary of UK Sport's coaching programs which is the best known UK Sport's Elite Coaching Apprenticeship Programme (ECAP) targeting emerging coaches (UK Sport, 2013h; 2014h). ECAP graduates, in this aspect, are exerting an indispensable part in British Cycling (UK Sport, 2013i). In 2013, Chris Newton was rewarded the appointment as the lead coach of women's track endurance squad (BC, 2013e); meanwhile, Paul Manning was awarded UK Sport's 2012 High Performance Team Coach of the Year (UK Sport, 2012e).

Foreign coaches made the noteworthy contribution of enriching and upgrading British elite cycling. Actually, British Cycling shows willingness to hire high-level foreign specialists, aiming to enhance the National Squad over the past twenty years. Shane Sutton (Australian), Jan Van Eijden (German) and Heiko Salzwedel (German) constitute the most celebrated representatives. Shane Sutton, the previous Head Coach of Team GB and current Technical Director, has been a ten-year employees to Team GB ever since the year 2002. Praised for exerting a key role in the upsurge of British Cycling around the world, coupled with the BC's never-achieved success in Beijing 2008 and London 2012 (BBC Sport, 2012a). The year 2010 saw the event that Shane Sutton was entitled as OBE (BC, 2010b).

Jan Van Eijden was appointed as a coach of the British National Squad, which presented the direct response of the BC to the changed event-setting during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. As

of the BC's prior advantage of men's 1km time trial was removed, top cyclists, Chris Hoy included, began to focus upon to the preparation for sprint events. What British Cycling former sprint champion Jan Van Eijden believed is to be an ideal person training Chris Hoy and later Victoria Pendleton (BC, 2012c; Golf Club Management, 2012). The appointment triggered positive outcomes; both Chris Hoy and Victoria Pendleton harvested high success in Beijing and London. Jan Van Eijden's recruitment made clear that the effects of international organisations - the IOC and UCI under these circumstances, on the making of British Cycling's policy. Nonetheless, the BC's successful response interpreted that this impact does not have any negativity. It is likely that active adaptation will give rise to positive outcomes. More than that, the progress of British sprinters is also a big beneficiary from some German experience from Jan Van Eijden (BC, 2006b). That provides a more enhanced model of Dolowitz and Marsh's (1996) theory on voluntary policy learning and transfer.

Coaching

There exist two obvious distinctions concerning the training of the GB National Squad. First, the highly centralized feature. British Cycling, which boasts an early adopter of a centralised approach, makes the National Squad situated in the headquarters in Manchester for training (BC, 2014c; National Cycling Centre, 2014). According to the announcement of Peter King (quoted in Golf Club Management, 2012), it was a method to have everything concentrated Manchester, which was determined and accepted as a segment of decided the post-1996 reform. Thereby, according to Kingdon's (1984) theoretical perspective, Atlanta 1996 created a policy window, orient with the revolution as well as reform of the BCF; a centralised regime was adopted and applied as a way out to a string of difficulties concerning talent and athlete development, coaching as well as training. In truth, along with the Senior National Squad, cyclists of the Olympic Academy Programme also headquarter themselves in the National Cycling Centre in Manchester for the purpose of accessing

quality resources and coaching. Just as he summarization of Dave Brailsford (2012, quoted in Slater, 2012b), a strong advocate and promoter of centralisation believing athletes' better performance while under the same roof, the centralised approach is able to produce intensity-based competitive environment for athletes by cultivating 'competitive beasts'. Resources harbor more efficient concentration and integration on the condition of this centralised strategy. More importance lies in the fact that the BC's success has led to its centralised approach going beyond cycling, which is achieved depending on the being followed and accepted by a series of Olympic sports (Slater, 2012b). A general agreement has been reached, crossing the large part British Olympic sports -- 'we are usually better together' (Slater, 2012b). The 'popularisation' of centralisation is setting another example of voluntary policy learning and transfer as well as mimetic isomorphism.

Besides, another key principle going through British Cycling's recent development comes from the philosophy of incrementalism. According to Dave Brailsford argument (2008, quoted in UK Sport, 2008c, p. 14), British Cycling's success can be traced to 'the aggregation of marginal gains - finding that extra one per cent in everything we do' as marginal gains underpinning British Cycling's dominance (Slater, 2012a). The starting of the aggregation of marginal gains' marked an indispensable product of the BC's overall review and estimation on its performance in Athens 2004 (Golf Club Management, 2012). In spite of BC's successful two-gold performance in Athens, the BC were aware that their task was to commit more for the maintenance and expansion of their advantage. 'Athens kick started probably the most intense programme of assessment and detail refinement ever to be seen in British sport. We realised that there were no more quantum leaps to be made - such as Chris Boardman's Lotus bike in Barcelona or the intense training methods we were already adopting in Manchester. The world is catching up.

Everybody's equipment was getting better and the rules had been tightened to minimise opportunities for technological advantage. We needed a new approach to not only stay ahead but to try to move out of reach. Hence the oft-quoted programme of "the aggregation of marginal gains".

(Peter King, quoted in Golf Club Management, 2012)

Evidently, Athens 2004 and the consequential estimation and review pioneered a policy window for the foundation of the aggregation of marginal gains', which is also a policy innovation model. UK's performance in Athens 2004 proved to be a success. Thereby, the starting of the project symbolized a solution to the demanded stay ahead in the world by expanding its advantage as contrary to a 'problem'. The highest degree policy entrepreneur was Dave Braisford and he did convey the philosophy of strict marginal gains to the BC. As a matter of fact, the philosophy of marginal gains is an already existence in the BC previous to Athens 2004. The reason was that it was brought in by Dave Braisford appointed as the NPD in 2003 (BC, 2014p). It turned out that the achieved success in in Athens 2004 tells the value of the marginal gains philosophy in virtue of opening a window for improvement of the philosophic conception in the team in the form of a program.

Competition Opportunities

British Cycling is a founder of a structured domestic competition system. The main domestic competitions, which is best known as the annual event National Championships and National Series for track, road, BMX and mountain bike, is a provider of a valuable platform oriented with junior, youth and senior cyclists (BC, 2011a; 2012b; 2013b). The Senior National Squad cyclists, or the Podium cyclists, make up the participators in a broad range of international competitions. The World Championships for four Olympic disciplines offer the most largely significant non-Olympic events targeted by the BC (BC, 2013m). Moreover, European Championships, World Cup and Series supply competition opportunities for top British cyclists as well (BC, 2013b). The Youth and Junior Squads take part in competitions, involving the UCI World and European Youth and Junior Championships and the UCI Under 23 Nations Cup (BC, 2011a).

Scientific Research

The EIS is a supplier of the BC based on substantial scientific and medical support which take place at Sport City in Manchester, geographically adjacent to the Manchester Headquarters. At present the EIS backs 86 cyclists, together with more than £1.01 million has been allowed to EIS services from the beginning of 2009 (EIS, 2012b). The EIS's support is involved in a large scope of areas, ranging from biomechanics, performance analysis, physiology, towards sport medicine, and even to lifestyle support and psychology (EIS, 2012b). Actually, the development of elite cycling is ever a good attraction arising government interest. A typical instance is that cycling worked as the first user of UK Sport and BAE System's Wind Tunnel testing system (BAE Systems, 2012; UK Sport, 2014m).

It is acknowledged that scientific support made great contribution to the BC's successes. Especially, the accumulation of incremental promotion in a wider range scientific field exerts a critic part in the BC's rise in the duration of the two most recent Olympic Games. Led by David Brailsford, the BC, which aims at the expanded British cyclists' advantage in the world after Athens 2004, has been building up an area of a careful identification for the enhancement in virtue of making consistent efforts in each likely progress.

'Between 2004 and 2008 we looked at every aspect of athlete preparation and lifestyle, equipment, clothing, training methods, nutrition and anything else which might produce a marginal gain. We put the bikes and the riders into a wind tunnel. We used nutritionists to ensure that no athlete carried an ounce of spare weight. We experimented with dozens of types of material for skin suits'. (Peter King, quoted in Golf Club Management, 2012).

A major contributory element to the success in 'the aggregation of marginal gains' stood by the complete secrecy of the key technologies. It was testified by the reference to the 'secret squirrel club'. under the establishment of Dave Brailsford and the direct direction of former Olympic champion Chris Boardman. It aims to seek marginal gains employing technological advances across such fields as sport, science, industry and military and equipment (BBC Sport, 2013a; Gallagher,

2011).

International influence

During the last twenty years, Cycling represents a superior representative of the UK's strengthened international influence. After all, when backing in the mid-1990s, the BCF's voice still uttered a weak voice in the UCI because of the non-existence of British member in the UCI Executive Committee.

'We no longer have any representation on this Committee and are therefore unable to influence the final decision. Where the UCI fails to seek comments on proposed changes, these would simply go direct to the UCI Executive Committee and we would have no knowledge of the proposals until a decision had been made and announced'.(National Council Meeting minutes, BCF, 1997, p. 3)

Nevertheless, British cycling has attained hugely elevated position around the world, the phenomenon is revealed by an increasingly number and nature of positions under the occupation of British representatives in the UCI and UEC, along with the enhancement in the number of major international and continental cycling events the UK showed. The BC has been evolved to be one of the most powerful National Federations in the UCI as well as one of the 'leading lights' in international cycling (BC, 2012e, p. 9). The establishment of UK Sport's strategy for the reconstruction of influence in the ILP-included international sport has profited a large string of sports governing bodies, which include the BC. Jonny Clay was involved the inaugural edition of ILP (UK Sport, 2014l) and Charles Jackson was added into the list of the most recent edition (UK Sport, 2013f).

British Cycling has achieved a vastly growing domestic and international fame., which comes out of the recently-obtained unprecedenced success of British cyclists on the international stage (BC, 2014q; Slater, 2013). As a consequence, a growing number of Britons, which have embarked on a variety of organs of the UCI and UEC. There is no doubt that highlight was made on Brian

Cookson's election as president of the UCI in 2013 (BBC Sport, 2013b; UK Sport, 2013g). Brian Cookson, who had been the first Briton ever since 1994, aimed to win the election of president of an international federation belonging to a core summer Olympic sport (UK Sport, 2013g). The fact signifies more affirmation of the BC's international position; also, the interests of British Cycling in during the commitment of key policy decisions can be guaranteed (BC, 2014q). Brian Cookson, who is the UCI president, has the membership of the UCI Executive Board (UCI, 2014b) in virtue of fulfilling the coexistent roles of the president of not only the International Development and National Federations' Commission and the Equipment Commission (UCI, 2014i; 2014j). Moreover, several British members are performing their duty on kinds of UCI commissions (see Table 5.4).

Table 5.4. British members in the UCI

Name	Organs and Position
Brian Cookson	President of the UCI; Member of the Executive Board; President of the International Development and National Federations' Commission; President of the Equipment Commission
Charlie Jackson	Member of the Road Commission
Helen Wyman	Member of the Cyclo-cross Commission
Sarah Storey	Riders' representative of the Para-cycling Commission
Andy Cook	Member of the Mass Participation Events Commission
Chris Jarvis	Member of the CAD - Anti-doping Commission

Emma Pooley Rider's representative of the Women's
Commission

Sources: UCI (2014b; 2014c; 2014d; 2014e; 2014f; 2014g; 2014h; 2014i; 2014j).

The putting-on- of major international events means the BC's another dominating pursuit. The official identification of 'To exercise Britain's international influence by staging major international events in the UK' worked as a key policy objective and then clearly announced in the BC's 2009-2013 Plan (BC, 2009c). Major International Events program, 'develop international influence and provide home advantage for the GB Cycling Team' (BC, 2011a, p. 14), is a success in inviting many international cycling events, which include the 2012 UCI BMX World Championships in Birmingham (BC, 2012b) and the imminent 2016 UCI Track World Championships in London (BC, 2013g; UK Sport, 2013e). UK Sport supplies support for the UCI World Championships and World Cups in virtue of the Gold Event Series (UK Sport, 2012d). Britain has been evolved to be 'a trusted and respected host of major international cycling events' (BC, 2014q).

3.2 British Swimming

Introduction

In this study, swimming refers to a narrow meaning which exclude synchronised swimming, water polo and diving. Since its debut in Paris 1900, the British Olympic swimming delegation has only missed once in St. Louise 1904 (AR, 2014e). Though the general medal performance of British swimmers in Olympic Games was always being deemed as stable, the most appropriate word to describe their performance was 'intermittent'. Judging from the medal performance at summer Olympic Games (until 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympics), swimming could be classified to a secondary source of medals to the UK with 16 gold medals and 74 total medals which acted as the seventh and the third largest contributors in each category.

Organisational Structure

British Swimming (BS), as the leading authority in Great Britain (UK Sport, 2020...), is responsible for the development of elite swimming, synchronised swimming, water polo and diving in the UK. In the meanwhile, British Swimming is a member of British Olympic Association and the only recognised representative agent of British swimming in FINA (FINA, 2020). According to the agent information, there are 12 members in the BS Board including an athlete representative (BS, 2020).

According to the most recently published strategic plan by BS (2020, p. 5), three strategic objectives were identified for 2018- 2024, which are known as Vision, Mission & Objectives:

- Vision for 2024

By 2014 British Swimming will have a sustainable, world-leading system that guarantees Olympic podium success.

- Mission for 2020

British Swimming will win 5-8 medals in Tokyo 2020 as a step towards building an effective, innovative system to consistently win more medals on the World and Olympic Stage.

- Smart Objectives & Milestone Targets (MST)

The set of SMART objectives and milestone targets provide the key success indicators to track our progress towards delivery of our 2020 Mission.

The Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) (established in 1886) is very significant amongst the BS' three national governing bodies (England, Scotland and Wales). The function and structure of ASA and BS, in part because of the strong influence of the ASA, have always been ambiguous (Green & Houlihan, 2005). For example, the main staff and position between the ASA and the BS are overlapped. What is worth mentioning, though the two organisations are legally and financially divided from each other, the scope of their duties remain equal (the liability for ASA is limited to England, with Scotland and Wales having their own ASAs). As suggested (cited in ASA and BS, 2013b, p. 42), by ASA's Chief Executive Officer, David Sparkes, 'ASA is complementary to British

Swimming' work.

The reform of the Amateur Swimming Federation of Great Britain (ASFGB) with being renamed as British Swimming in 2000 was regarded as watershed in the process of organisational specialisation. In order to obtain fund from the Lottery, NGBs had set and achieve performance or medal goals. It turned out that sports with better medal performance became the biggest beneficiaries from this policy.

Financial Support

Since the commencement of the National Lottery, the elite swimming in the UK has become one of the largest beneficiaries which was provided with large amounts of fund to enhance its performance. Most of the grants were poured into the World Class Performance Programme (WCP) which was introduced in the above. To elaborate, at present, there are 53 elite swimmers on the list of the World Class Performance Programme (UK Sport, 2020). As mentioned by the Olympic champion Rebecca Adlington, the commitment of National lottery funds ensures full-time training and the arsenal of top-tier coaches, appliances and facilities for the elite swimmers (UK Sport, 2013j). The influences of UK Sport imposed on NGBs including the BS have been reinforced through the financial leverage generated by allocation National Lottery funds, which can be regarded as the use of reliance on financial capital as a policy mechanism to improve the compliance of organisations throughout the process of policy implementation.

Illustrated in the following table, two surges in funding can be witnessed, one for the Sydney Olympiad and the other for the Beijing Olympiad. What else can be found from the Table 6 is the proof of the implementation of UK Sport's 'No Compromise' investment strategy. Due to the disastrous medal performance in 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the funding for British elite swimmers was slightly cut for the Athens Olympiad. On the contrary, the accomplishments achieved in Beijing 2008 resulted in the backflow of large amounts of subsidiaries for the preparation of 2012

London Olympiad. However, in 2012 London Olympic Games, the BS failed in both targets set prior to the game, which are winning at least one gold medal and obtaining six medals in total. This failure resulted in a 14.9% cut in grants for 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic cycle (BBC Sport, 2012).

Table 6. Funding received by the BS and its predecessor ASFGB from UK Sport and its predecessor GB Sports Council from the Barcelona Olympiad to the Rio de Janeiro Olympiad

Olympiad	Figure
Barcelona Olympiad	£1,371,978
Atlanta Olympiad	£1,325,375
Sydney Olympiad	£6,900,000
Athens Olympiad	£6,400,000
Beijing Olympiad	£20,659,000
London Olympiad	£25,144,600
Rio de Janeiro Olympiad	£21,352,191
Total	£83,153,144

Note: Funding figure for the Atlanta Olympiad is estimated, as official annual reports are inaccessible.

Sources: GB Sports Council, annual reports, various years between 1990 and 1996; UK Sport, annual reports and financial statements, various years between 2000 and 2013; UK Sport (2011a; 2014a; 2014b); Zheng (2011, p. 181).

Talent Identification and Athlete Development

According to the information mentioned earlier, a systematic method of talent identification has long

been absent in the UK swimming which leads to the failure at Olympic Games prior to the 21st century. Though the WCP Programme provided British Swimming with benefits in talent measurement, the advent of the Australian Bill Sweetenham as the performance director of the BS in November 2000 (ASA, 2000b) was a milestone in the development of British Swimming for a series of novel methods and revolutionary ideas within the domain of talent identification being brought to Great Britain. Whereafter, the Long Term Athlete Development (LTAD) was introduced in 2003 to better serve the development of elite swimming in the UK for the next decade (ASA, 2003b). This programme was deliberately designed with preference given to specific age groups (ASA, 2010a). There are 5 stages in this framework, which are Fundamentals (male 6-9, female 5-8), Swim Skills (male 9-12, female 8-11), Training to train (male 12-15, female 11-14), Training to Compete (male 15-18, female 14-16), and Training to Win (male 18+, female 16+). The Furthermore, Swim21 Club Program is ASA's unique development plan for the club, designed to improve the partnership between the NGB and the swimming club, making it necessary to optimise the use of club resources and allow the club to better serve LTAD implementation (ASA, 2003c; 2014).

The successful bidding of the 2012 Olympic Games in London has enhanced the process of talent identification in Great Britain. To be more specific, in swimming, the England Talent Development Programme (ETDP) was initiated in 2007, within which eight regional camps at three different levels from the country have been involved. The age of the targeted swimmers was from 12 to 20 in the ETDP. Levels 1 and 2 are carried out at the regional level, while level 3 is carried out at the national level (ASA, 2007; 2008a). Furthermore, more than 100 of the most talented swimmers from all over the country were summoned together to form the London 2012 Olympic Target team in 2008 (ASA, 2008A; 2008c).

The inability of British swimmers to fulfill the medal requirement in 2012 London Olympic Games led to significant rethink of the current system and several novel steps have been taken. First, the Podium Potential Programme, identified as 'groundbreaking in the UK' was established (ASA &

BS, 2013e, p. 19). The Podium Potential Program limits the target audience by focusing on and offering more holistic and comprehensive support to potential medal swimmers.

Coaching

According to Dryden (2002), in the aftermath of the disastrous performance at Sydney Olympics in 2000, the former Australian Olympic Head Coach Bill Sweetenham was entrusted as the National Performance Director of British Swimming at this critical and difficult moment, which was also deemed as a milestone during the development of British swimming. According to the commentation of the Chief Executive David Sparkes (2014, quoted in The Independent, 2014), ‘the biggest turning point was when we got Bill Sweetenham ... he changed the attitude, the professionalism, the way people trained, the way the coaches worked... The mindset is much more professional - it’s now built in and everyone buys into it. He was tough and he was eccentric but sport is tough. He was a great leader. We are still benefiting from his work now’. As Bill Sweetenham clarified, ‘our team motto is that winning is the only option. We don’t want to know about anything else’ (quoted in Dryden, 2002, p. 13). The policy of taking full advantage of progressive foreign knowledge and human resources has been inherited and extended by the BS despite the departure of Bill Sweetenham in 2007 (BBC Sport, 2007). Soon after, another Australian Michael Scott was presented the position of the National Performance Director (NPD) in 2007, making the overall planning for Team GB in Beijing 2008 and London 2012 (BBC Sport, 2012a). Furthermore, after the Beijing Olympic Games, the American Dennis Pursley took over the head coach of Team GB (ASA, 2008d). However, Bill Furniss and Chris Spice have been named Great Britain head coach and national performance director after the resignation of Michael Scott in 2013, which demonstrated the BS’ intention of ‘borrowing’ experience from other sports because of Spice’s previous career experience of working as former rugby, hockey and basketball Chief. (Daily Mail, 2013). The employment of sophisticated and senior coaches from abroad revealed the BS’s determination and attitude towards

taking advantage of foreign expertise and advanced concepts to boost the development of British elite swimming, which also reflects the policy learning and policy transfer from two traditional swimming power, Australia and the US.

A more concrete instance of learning and transfer of policy from foreign countries can be reflected on the financial incentive scheme for top coaches cultivating Olympic medal winners in 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, which has already been implemented in Australia and the US (ASA, 2008b). Coaches who successfully cultivated Olympic medalist were able to receive £10,000, £7,500 and £5,000 for gold, silver and bronze respectively. Additional reward was proffered to coaches who have cultivated more than one medalist or one athletes with more than one medal (ASA, 2008b). These are the NGBs' use of inducements and rewards. This voluntary policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996) included elements of inspiration and emulation (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996).

Chris Spice pointed out three areas for improvement the first of which was coaching: 'The first is coaching and making the coaches better. I don't think we've invested enough in that. We have some very good coaches but we need to make them world class. We need to put resource and energy into making as many world class coaches as we can'. (Chris Spice 2013, quoted in ASA & BS, 2013f, p. 40)

One of the most prominent action that has been taken by the UK is the establishment of the Elite Programme, the aim of which is to enhance and develop current world class coaches working within the British system, to enable them to become truly world leading coaches of the future (BS, 2020a). After the confirmation that Chris Spice will take up the role of Team Leader in Tokyo as he did in Rio, with Furniss and Dawn Peart also replicating the Head Coach and Team Manager roles they performed in Brazil, eight of Britain's best swimming coaches have been nominated by British Swimming to take on key roles with Team GB during the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games next summer which can be seen as the periodic success of the aforementioned scheme (BS, 2020b).

Training

Bill Sweetenham has initiated a large-scale systematic transformation of British elite swimming, of which the training part is the focal part. Bill Sweetenham (2003, quoted in ASA, 2003a, p. 23) clearly criticised the minimum training and maximum competition methods of the British swimming team, and emphasised the importance of adequate training time and coaches striving for excellence in leadership at the world's highest level of competitions. As Bill Sweetenham said, the Olympic Games should be the only target pursued by all outstanding coaches and athletes. British elite athletes must participate more selectively in competitions (Dryden, 2002). Former Potential Director John Atkinson (ASA, 2001) coincides with the criticism of British swimmers that they spent a lot of time in inessential competitions (ASA, 2001). It is precisely because of the change in training concepts and attitudes (Dryden, 2002) that BS took a series of measures accordingly. First of all, the assembled training of the national team is more regular and routinised. According to the recommendations of BS in its 2005 annual report, selected elite swimmers should guarantee at least 200 days of training in an outdoor 50-meter swimming pool annually (BS, 2005). It is particularly worth mentioning that Bill Sweetenham attached great importance to the role of training (ASA, 2006). He adopted a more strict and rigid training system, in which selected elite swimmers in the national team usually start a day of training at 6 in the morning (The Independent, 2014).

Although Bill Sweetenham later quit the team GB, his concept of emphasis on training has not diminished. In the post-Sweetenham era, BS further developed the training concept while maintaining the basic training concepts and attitudes that have been formed to the greatest extent. What was most worth mentioning is the Intensive Training Center (ITC) programme (ITC). As part of the plan to achieve success in London in 2012, the Intensive Training Center (ITC) sponsored by British Gas was founded in 2008 with five standing bases, located in Loughborough, Bath, Swansea, Stirling and Stockport respectively (BS, 2013c). Each training center was assigned a head coach and many full-time staff to proffer sufficient support (ASA, 2008f). The establishment of ITC means that

the concentration of swimming in the UK has greatly surged. As officially outlined by ASA (2009b, pages 30-31), ‘the five ITCs recently launched by British Swimming are aimed at providing talented swimmers with a fully integrated training programme in one location’. In addition, in terms of the preparation for middle and long distance swimming athletes, the BS has also arranged altitude training and overseas training (ASA&BS, 2009; BS, 2012) in the United States, Australia, Singapore, Spain and South Africa.

After the disastrous performance of British Swimming team on its home soil in 2012, several harsh measures of ‘punishment’ were imposed on it. Firstly, the fund was cut and three of the five ITCs were closed, namely Stockport, Swansea and Sterling ITC (2013d). Therefore, intensive training is more concentrated in the centers of Loughborough and Bath. The more striking change is that after the 2012 London Olympics report, a competition-specific system was adopted to replace the previous national team concentrated training mode. In 2013, six training camps based on specific competitions were organised. Each training camp gathered top British swimmers to ‘for focused and more bespoke training and development activity’ (BS, 2013b, p. 10). This less focused yet more versatile national team structure and training method is an invention of the British swim team (ASA&BS, 2013a).

Scientific Research

Since 2002, the EIS has been providing British Swimming with substantial grants to enhance its development in the area of sport medicine, physiology, psychology, nutrition and so on (EIS, 2012c). The EIS support team is always working in tandem with the BS support team. Normally they worked and stayed together in training bases with elite swimming athletes of the UK.

Amounts of sports science and sports medicine (SSSM) programme have been operated by the end of the London Olympic cycle (reported over 20 projects by 2011, BS, 2011). The foundation of SSSM programme is to proffer sufficient support to those who performed outstanding in the pool (BS, 2014m). Both of intensive training center (ITC) and non-intensive training center swimmers are

able to obtain support from core scientific staff and SSSM practitioners recruited (BS, 2010; 2014m). Until 2014, over 100 WCP swimmers have been provided support from SSSM project (BS, 2014m). Recently, the skills in starts and turns have become a central field of research. A variety of initiatives have been taken to enhance the ability of British elite swimmer's starts and turns. To elaborate, taking advantage of the Swimtrack software which provides quantitative analysis via visual image and the Starts and Turns Technical Plan are of the prevalent methods conducted (BS, 2011). Furthermore, the advanced experience and technique of the US Teams are transferred by Bob Bowman to British Swimming (ASA & BS, 2013d).

Two sports science related field of research have been prioritised for development which were athletes' self-management and psychology in the aftermath of 2012 London Olympic Games (ASA & BS, 2013a; 2013f; BS, 2013b). An Athlete Self-Management Guide and the copies were composed by the BS and then distributed to all swimmers who were fully funded by the BS. In terms of psychology, it was always recognised as the weakness composition in the preparation for Olympics in the BS. Former BS NPD Bill Sweetenham (2005, quoted in BS, 2005) clearly emphasised Psychology's relevance to the success will be achieved at Olympics and the need to focus of more elite veterans as they reflect on Athens 2004's success, because of their comparatively higher psychological maturity. More concrete steps have been taken immediately after the 2012 London Olympics, one example of which is a three-year project in partnership with Loughborough University and other collaborators focusing on the enhancement of psychological preparedness and mental toughness (BS, 2013b).

3.3 British Taekwondo

Introduction

Taekwondo made its debut as a demonstration sport at the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics in 1988 in South Korea, and remained a display event in the following two Olympics in Barcelona and Atlanta

in 1992 and 1996. Taekwondo became a full medal sport at the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, Australia, and has been an Olympic programme since then. Two British athletes competed at Sydney Summer Olympic Games in 2000, among whom Colin Daley ranked fifth in Men's Heavyweight and Sarah Stevenson ranked fourth in Women's Welterweight (Olympedia, 2020c). Team GB's first Olympic medalist was Sarah Stevenson when she won bronze at Beijing 2008. Four years later, the 19-year-old Jade Jones achieved the gold medal breakthrough in 2012 London Olympics, and then she repeated that golden success at Rio 2016 in defending her title in Women's feather. Lutalo Muhammad won bronze at London 2012 and then silver at Rio 2016 while Bianca Walkden took bronze in Brazil as three of Team GB's four athletes won medals at the Games. Though it is a tradition for most of the British Olympic medal-winning sports that men outperformed women, the medal performance of British Taekwondo at Olympic Games proffered a counter example which can be found in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. The UK's medal performance in Taekwondo between Sydney 2000 and Rio 2016

Edition	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total	Medal Points	Ranking
Sydney 2000	0	0	0	0	0	–
Athens 2004	0	0	0	0	0	–
Beijing 2008	0	0	1	1	1	15
London 2012	1	0	1	2	5	5
Rio de Janeiro	1	1	1	3	6	3

2016					
Total	2	1	3	6	12

Note: Medal points = the number of gold medals x 3 + the number of silver medals x 2 + the number of bronze x 1

Sources: ...

Organisational Structure

British Taekwondo, established in 1982, is the governing body for World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) Taekwondo in the UK. British Taekwondo is a member of the World Taekwondo Federation (WTF) Taekwondo, British Olympic Association (BOA), the European Taekwondo (ETU) and recognised by UK Sport, the government agency for High Performance Sport as well as Sport England, as the National Governing Body for WTF Taekwondo in the United Kingdom.

British Taekwondo is responsible for all aspects of WTF/Olympic style taekwondo in the UK. This includes everything that is encompassed and practised through the Martial Art of Taekwondo, as well as selecting Great Britain National Teams to compete at the European and World Championships, and of course the Olympic Games.

GB Taekwondo, which was established in 2002, is responsible for the preparation, management and performance of British athletes at the Olympic Games, Paralympic Games and at World and European Championships. GB Taekwondo is based in Manchester, where the so-called full time 'World Class Performance' programme is carried out with the support from UK Sport and National Lottery. Currently, nearly 30 athletes are living and training out of the GB Taekwondo National Training Center in East Manchester. Furthermore, another programme which is known as the National Development Programme aiming to enhance the development of cadet and junior athletes and their progression as members of the elite squads is in operation with supplementary support from Sport England.

GB Taekwondo hosts and delivers regular major events which give Taekwondo athletes the chance to showcase their talents and benefit from home advantage. Recently They hosted several Grand Prix, the Para World Taekwondo Championships 2017 and the World Taekwondo Championships in 2019 at the Manchester Arena. Future events include a Grand Prix in 2021 and the World Taekwondo Grand Prix Final in 2023. Both events will be hosted in Manchester.

Financial Support

There are numerous ways in fund raising for British Taekwondo, such as through Sport England, Sports Council for NI, Sport Scotland and Sport Wales, Awards for All, the National Lottery and so forth. Similar to British Swimming and British Cycling, the contribution of the National Lottery to the advancement of British elite Taekwondo is significant. As can be seen in table below, there has been a surge in funding. Though there was a bronze medal attained by the British Taekwondo Team in Beijing Olympic Games, funding and grants kept being poured in because of the introduction of UK Sport's 'No Compromise' policy. With the unprecedented success achieved in 2012 London Olympic Games, a continuous rise in funding was witnessed. British Taekwondo Performance Director Gary Hall believed the sport's funding increase will make a 'huge difference' to Britain's chance of winning medals at Rio 2016 and beyond which turned out to be true with winning on gold, silver and bronze medal each at Rio 2016 (Reference...). As for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic preparation cycle, funding exceeds 9 million pound. In addition, in 2019, the British Government have pledged £50 million to support GB Taekwondo athletes at next year's Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo (Reference...). According to the most recently census, the funding from the World Class Programme is £ 8,223,805, while supportive grants from the Athlete Performance Award goes to £ 1,615,108.

Table 7.2. Funding received by the GB Taekwondo from UK Sport from the Sydney Olympiad to the

Tokyo Olympiad

Olympiad	Figure
Sydney	£ 600,000
Athens	£ 600,000
Beijing	£ 2,667,000
London	£ 4,833,600
Rio de Janeiro	£ 8,053,837
Tokyo	£ 9,838,913
Total	£ 26,593,350

Source: UK Sport (2020)

Talent Identification and Athlete Development

The Fighting Chance campaign initiated by GB Taekwondo in 2009 aimed to identify and select potential taekwondo athletes from over 1,000 applicants from a variety of other combat sports, including ITF Taekwondo, kickboxing, karate, Muay Thai and others for better performance in 2012 London Olympic Games (Mail, 2012). The programme turned out to be a success, as Lutalo Muhammad won Olympic bronze in the Men's 80kg and the 19-year-old Jade Jones attained the first ever gold medal for British taekwondo team in the Women's 57kg. Jade Jones shot to fame in the summer of 2012 by writing a new chapter in the history of British Taekwondo. As a beneficiary of the aforementioned talent identification programme, Jade made the switch from ITF Taekwondo to WTF Taekwondo (recognised style in Olympic Games) five years prior to 2012 London Olympic Games. As for another superstar in Britain's Taekwondo, Lutalo Muhammad started practising taekwondo at the age of 3 under his father's instruction. Then he was selected to join the Fighting Chance talent identification and confirmation programme in 2011 and was successfully selected to join the GB

Academy in the summer of 2011 and eventually won the bronze in 2012 London Olympic Games (UK Sport, 2020). During his time in the Academy he has gone from strength to strength, winning medals in major competitions and most notably winning bronze in the -80kg category at the London 2012 Olympic Games.

After the success achieved in 2012, the second phase of the Fighting Chance programme: Battle4Brazil was launched by a collaboration of UK Sport, the English Institute of Sport and GB Taekwondo aiming to better the preparation for 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games. The programme is aimed at high achieving 16-26-year-old male and female combat athletes from all kick based martial arts who believe they are capable of transferring to Olympic Taekwondo (WTF style) and making an impact on the medal table in 2016. As then GB Taekwondo performance director Gary Hall commented on the talent identification programme:

‘The original Fighting Chance talent identification campaign in 2009 was very successful for athletes to complement the talented juniors we were already developing. The new Fighting Chance: Battle4Brazil campaign should help us build on the successes we have had so far and reach wider audiences. The success we achieved in London was incredible but we are not resting on our laurels, there is more talent out there to discover.’(Gary Hall, 2012)

With a slight difference from the first phase of the Fighting Chance campaign, the range of targeted talents in Battle4Brazil were wider not only include those former ITF or other style Taekwondo athletes, but also those from other combat sports. Former Olympic medalist Sarah Stevenson was member of the panel and fully aware of what new recruits can bring to the programme.

“We don't want people to come here and just do taekwondo, we want to see what they have from their own style and skills and try to add ours to their strengths. There have been some amazing kickers and skills that we've seen and you think, ‘wow, we don't do that, perhaps we should learn

from them’.” (Not only TID, but also athlete transfer from a broader sports pool which significantly enhance UKT competitiveness in Olympic medal) (Sarah Stevenson, 2013)

As a result, the performance of the British Taekwondo delegation at Rio de Janeiro was outstanding. Lutalo Muhammad won the silver in the Men’s -80kg, Jade Jones won the second streak gold medal in the Women’s -57kg, and Bianca Walkden attained the bronze in the Women’s +67kg.

Coaching

The success of British Taekwondo team achieved at Olympic Games cannot be separated from the meritorious Gary Hall, who has become the Performance Director for the Great Britain Taekwondo Team since 2006. He has led the GB Taekwondo in all major events since 2001 and was the Team Leader at the Athens and Beijing Olympics. In his own athletic career as a Taekwondo Athlete he was the National Champion of Great Britain for 10 years and represented Great Britain at three European and World Championships. He has also coached his own Taekwondo school as well as being a National Team Coach for a collective period of over five years. Under his management, GB Taekwondo made constant progress at the Olympics in the past decade.

Korea (South Korea in particular), as the birthplace of Taekwondo, not only produced a huge array of talented Taekwondo athletes and Olympic medalists, but also transferred large number of excellent coaches worldwide to better develop this sport. There is no exception in the development of Britain’s elite Taekwondo. Jinmi Choi, who was appointed as the high-performance coach of GB Taekwondo in 2013, has worked closely with double Olympic champion, Jade Jones, and 2015 and 2017, World Championship gold medalist, Bianca Walkden, during her five years as an integral part of the Manchester-based, GB set-up. She has also helped massively with the development of younger athletes including 2015 World Championship bronze medalist, Rachele Booth, Junior World Championship bronze medalist, Rebecca McGowan and two-time European champion, Lauren Williams. Jinmi’s highlights of her GB career include Jade Jones’ 2016 World Taekwondo Grand

Prix final success in Baku and 2017 Grand Prix triumph in London, as well as, Bianca Walkden and Charlie Maddock's victories in the 2016 World Taekwondo Grand Prix final (GB Taekwondo, 2018). According to the most recently appointment announcement by GB Taekwondo, in order to continue enhancing the competitiveness of elite Taekwondo athletes and better prepare for the 2024 Paris Olympic Games, Former French National Taekwondo athlete Torann Maizeroi has taken his new post in September, 2020. In his new position, the main focus will be on cultivating female competitors who have great potential to acquire the ticket to the Paris 2024 Olympic Games (GB Taekwondo, 2020).

In addition to the elite level of coaching programme, GB Taekwondo provide club coaches with the opportunity to attend and observe GB Talent Pathway coaching camps (GB, Taekwondo, 2020). The concept of shared practice and joint learning proposed by GB Taekwondo aims to formalise the opportunity for all British Taekwondo member coaches. The interaction and knowledge exchange between the existing pathway coaches and club coaches is good for the development of taekwondo, since club coaches are able to take better advantage of acquired knowledge and technique to construct and cultivate more potential elite taekwondo athletes.

Training

The National Taekwondo Centre in Newton Heath, Manchester was established in 2016 as the training base for GB Taekwondo's Elite and Development athletes. The £2.7m project has been funded by Manchester City Council, Sport England and UK Sport, with management services at the centre delivered by the Eastlands Trust (GB Taekwondo, 2016...) Currently there are 19 athletes on in full-time training on the World Class Performance Programme (GB Taekwondo, 2020). According to the most recently issued 2018-2021 Development Programme, which is a Sport England funded camp based programme delivered at the National Taekwondo Centre, Manchester. Through this programme, selected athletes train four days per month spread across two weekends. The

Development Programme is led by a dedicated full-time coach supported by a team of contracted coaches and Sport Science and Medicine staff i.e., nutritionist, physiotherapist, strength and conditioning, etc.

Throughout the development programme the key emphasis is to focus on individual athlete progression through building upon current strengths, enhancing weaknesses, developing individual player identity and holistic personal development. Underpinning this holistic development will be the GB Taekwondo Player Development Framework, which emphasises the importance of personal growth and equipping players for a long term development journey above immediate medal success at development level. In addition to domestic training opportunities, for some of the squad further overseas training camps designed to challenge an athletes' ability to adapt and perform outside of their normal training environment will be available.

There will also be access to a series of workshops for both athletes and parents to support them to share the development journey of their sons/daughters. Finally, there will be opportunities for selected athletes on a performance trajectory to be included in teams for Junior Major Championships, European / World's. Over the course of the development journey athletes will be required to demonstrate progression not only in their personal development but significantly also in their skill acquisition, technical and tactical application and their physical robustness to establish the skillset to enable athletes to thrive in the Academy environment.

At a minimum, on an annual basis all members of the 'Development Programme' will be reviewed against their agreed individualised development objectives which can lead to one of three outcomes, retention on the 'Development Programme', deselection from the 'Development Programme' or promotion to the full-time Academy Programme. Where there is overwhelming and consistent evidence both tangible and subjective, that an athlete is progressing at a desirable level they may be identified for 'promotion' into the full-time Academy programme where they will be expected to be able to thrive within a world class environment. GB Taekwondo has also mapped out


the Player Development Framework, the philosophy of which is as followed:

‘Building robust and receptive Taekwondo players who can thrive in the world class training and competition environment’

‘... to cultivate a positive and nurturing environment which supports athletes with all aspects of their development and performance on and off the matt via a systematically individualised approach which is embraced by all coaches and coaching support staff’

Aside from the technical and tactical mastery, the programme is committed to athlete progression to include behaviours skillsets that will aid their ability/readiness to thrive within an elite training environment, as well as, aiding athletes if they are selected into the World Class Performance (WCP). To this end the Development team has identified six key pillars outlined below, that emphasise behaviours that compliment elite performance. In addition, identified athletes may also be exposed to selected Academy training opportunities which is designed to enhance their understanding of the Academy programme, as well as, to demonstrate readiness to graduate to the full time Academy programme.

The six pillars that goes towards developing a world class GB Taekwondo player



Competition Opportunities

As the location of the National Taekwondo Centre of the UK, Manchester wins bid to host 2022 European Taekwondo Championships. Manchester has been named as the host city for the 2022 European Taekwondo Championships just a month after staging the first-ever World Championships held in Great Britain (Inside the game, 2019). The city has a growing reputation for staging international Taekwondo events. In June, 2019, the decision by the World Taekwondo Europe Executive Board follows on from last month's decision to name Manchester as the host city for the 2023 World Taekwondo Grand Prix Final and award hosting rights for a World Taekwondo Grand Prix in 2021. Undertaking sports mega events and sports events in succession shows Britain's

determination of further improvement of GB Taekwondo's medal performance at Olympics. Matt Archibald, chief executive of GB Taekwondo, further explains the significance of holding world and regional competitions:

'Events run on a longer timescale than GBTKD's primary performance focus of preparing athletes for Olympic and Paralympic success. We have to look beyond Tokyo 2020 and to the Paris 2024 cycle to ensure we remain competitive in the event hosting domain.'

Sarah Stevenson Jennings, President of British Taekwondo and a multiple former European and world gold medalist, also commented:

'Bringing top-level events to Britain is not only a great platform for our athletes to perform in front of a home crowd' (Inside the game, 2019).

Limitation:

According to the proposal, the interviewees in UK is an ideal plan but not sure we can have them for the interview, especially those UK sport policy key persons have been very cautious about the confidentiality of its approaches to elite sport policy. Therefore, the interviews highly depends on the snowball method when I can fly to UK and stay in my research partner's university. Through their connection, I may be able to invite and interview the targeted interviewees. Due to the serious COVID-19 in UK, this action plan was not feasible. Fortunately, we can communicate with two researchers from Loughborough University and University of Northumbria through email or Wechat. Through them, we have a better understanding of UK sport policy. As I mentioned in the proposal, there is substantial information available from policy documents (printed and online) of relevant sports governing bodies in the UK and from media because of the high degree of information transparency in UK, these information still help us fulfill the sport policy analysis as an effective remedy.

“Quoted from proposal:

Regarding the interview possibilities in the UK, it is difficult to confirm the feasibility of interviews with performance managers, (head) coaches and athletes of the three sports in the UK, since the UK has been very cautious about the confidentiality of its approaches to elite sport policy, evidenced in for example, British Cycling's 'secret squirrel club' scheme (Zheng, 2015, p. 267). But the research team will fully explore the interview possibility through the link of some members. The ideal plan would be to carry out approximately 18 semi-structured interviews in total for the UK, including six with general level sports officials from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), UK Sport, British Olympic Association, and some leading elite sport researchers from Loughborough University, University of Birmingham, Manchester Metropolitan University, Sheffield Hallam University and Brunel University, and 12 interviews with insiders in British Cycling, British Swimming and British Taekwondo (performance manager, head coach, athlete, and other policy participant). Nevertheless, there is substantial information available from policy documents (printed and online) of relevant sports governing bodies in the UK and from media because of the high degree of information transparency in this nation, and interviews with leading sports scholars in the UK would be very likely. These will offer an effective remedy."

3.4 Hong Kong Cycling

Introduction

As one of the four Tier-A* sports in Hong Kong, cycling enjoys substantial funding, training services. In 2007 UCI Track World Championships Wong Kam-po made Hong Kong's history and became the first Hong Kong World Champion cyclist by securing the first place in 15 km-scratch. It starts the UIC winning records and five more world champions were won after Mr. Wong. In 2012 London Olympics, a bronze medal was attained by the cyclist Lee Wai Sze in women's Keirin event. Additionally, in the 2018 Jakarta Palembang Asian Games, Hong Kong cyclists achieved eight medals in total, including three gold medals, four silver medals and one bronze medal, which made

cycling the largest contributors of medals and gold medals to Hong Kong Asian Games delegation. Moreover, two gold medals were won in China's National Games. It can be concluded that Hong Kong Cycling team has been successful in winning medals in international competitions. The detailed information on Hong Kong cycling achievement can be found in the following tables.

Table 8.1. A summary of Hong Kong's performance in cycling at the Asian Games from Bangkok 1998 to Jakarta Palembang 2018

Edition	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total
Bangkok 1998	1	0	1	2
Busan 2002	0	0	2	2
Doha 2006	2	0	0	2
Guangzhou 2010	4	4	1	9
Incheon 2014	2	1	3	6
Jakarta Palembang 2018	3	4	1	8
Total	12	9	8	29

Source: <https://www.hkolympic.org/medallists/>

Table 8.2. A summary of Hong Kong's performance in cycling at the National Games from Shanghai 1997 to Liaoning 2013

Edition	Gold	Silver	Bronze	Total
Shanghai 1997	1	0	0	1
Guangdong 2001	2	0	0	2
Jiangsu 2005	1	0	2	3
Shandong 2009	1	1	1	3

Liaoning 2013	1	0	2	3
Total	6	1	5	12

Source: https://www.lcsd.gov.hk/sc/ngames/2017/hkintro/previous_result.html

Table 8.3. A summary of Hong Kong's 1st place at UCI Track Cycling World Championships

Name	Edition	Event
Wong Kam-po	2007	Scratch
Kwok Ho-ting	2011	Scratch
Leung Chun-wing	2012 (Junior)	Points Race
Lee Wai-sze	2013	500m Time Trial
Lee Wai-sze	2019	Keirin Sprint

Source: <http://www.cyclingarchives.com/>


Organisational Structure

Hong Kong Cycling Association (HKCA) was established in 1960. At the very beginning, the major mission of this organisation is to promote road race, and then included track race, BMX race, indoor cycling artistic and cycle-ball. It was until 1994 that the mountain bike race and youth & children cycling race were covered in the responsibility of the HKCA, which made Hong Kong become the region with most local cycling events in Asia. With the encouragement of the Leisure and Cultural Service Department, the 'The Cycling Association of Hong Kong, China Limited' (CAHK) was founded in April 2014 and formally operated on July 1 of the same year. It replaced the 'Hong Kong Cycling Association' and improved the governance.

Talent Identification and Athlete Development

Furthermore, in collaboration with the HKSI, CAHK commenced to discover and cultivate talented athletes with potential ability. There is a systematic pathway illustrating how to become an elite cyclist to participate in international competitions on behalf of Hong Kong.

Figure 4. Hong Kong Cycling Association-Road & Track Cycling Sport Development



Source: <http://www.cycling.org.hk/page.aspx?corpname=hkca&i=683&locale=en-US>

Two representative examples can reflect the success of the above talent identification programme. Leung Chun-wing, who is the bearer of gold medal of 2012 UCI Track Cycling World Championships Junior and Lee Sze-wing, who is the winner of two gold medals at 2019 Asian Track Championships Junior, emerged from the Future Star Programme in 2006-07 and 2014-15 respectively. Both of them then chose to become full-time athletes and receive financial support and training services from the HKSI (LCSD, 2020).

According to the Road and Track Cycling Sport Development Chart (CAHK, 2019), the talent identification programme contains ‘Young Athletes Cycling Training Scheme’ hosted by CAHK and ‘Hong Kong Cycling Stars of Future’ hosted by CAHK and HKSI. The former provides youth with training skills, as well as cycling safety and repair knowledge. Outstanding participants in this

programme will be recommended to the Future Star Programme. ‘Participants of Future Star Programme will be arranged to take part in the fitness test which is a preliminary screening for designated events. Students with potentials will be selected for the basic training, and will be recommended by their coaches for further professional training once their skills are mature enough. Students with outstanding performance may be chosen to become athletes with scholarships in Hong Kong Sports Institute and be all-round supported as elite athletes (CAHK, 2017). In order to enlarge the talent pool and attract more students to take part in cycling, CAHK initiated the cycling academy in parallel with the Young Athletes Cycling Training Scheme to compete with other NSAs for more talented students among the secondary schools.

Coaching

Despite the early start of cycling sport in Hong Kong, until the 1990s, the Hong Kong cycling team did not win any world championships. This phenomenon did not change until 1994, and it was in this year that the former head coach of the Chinese National Cycling Team, Shen Jinkang, was appointed as the head coach of the Hong Kong Cycling Team. His arrival also opened a new era for the development of elite cycling in Hong Kong. During his tenure as the head coach of HK cycling team, many famous athletes have sprung up, such as Wong Kam Po, Lee Wai Sze, Kwok Ho Ting, Cheung King Wai and so on.

Training

The Hong Kong Velodrome (HKV) was officially completed in late 2013. The Hong Kong Velodrome which cost HK\$1.13 billion is the first-ever indoor facility that meets the UCI standards. With a 250-metre long wooden cycling track, a multi-purpose area and a spectator stand, it can accommodate an audience of 3,000. One of the important missions of the velodrome is to provide a local, fixed and high-quality training base for Hong Kong Cycling Team. Before the HKV, the indoor

track elite cyclists could only practice in China mainland or overseas, and had never been trained in a fixed or high-standard indoor track in Hong Kong. With the completion of HKV, head coach Shen said that ‘the Hong Kong Cycling Team no long needs to wander and Sarah regarded it as her home (GovHK, 2013). Since 2014, HKV has become the official training base of Hong Kong Cycling Team.

Competition opportunities

The development of Hong Kong cycling is booming, especially after the success achieved by Wong Kam Po and Lee Wai Sze. The advancement of this sport proffered the athletes more opportunities to compete in the international stage. According to the past 5 years’ statistics, elite cyclists from Hong Kong participated in Olympic Games, Asian Games, Track Cycling World Championship and Asian Cycling Championships.

(1) In the 34th Asian Cycling Championships cum the 21st Asian Junior Cycling Championships in 2014, Hong Kong athletes accomplished with 5 Gold, 3 Silver and 5 Bronze medals;

(2) In the 14th Asian Games, 2 Gold, 1 Silver and 3 Bronze medals were secured by Hong Kong cyclists. LEE Wai Sze won the champions in the Women's Keirin and Women's Sprint respectively, Cheung King Lok obtained the bronze in the Men's Omnium, WONG Wan Yiu Jamie won the bronze in the Women's Individual Time Trial, LEUNG Chun Wing won the bronze in the Men's Individual Road Race, and Chan Chun Hing obtained the silver medal in the Men's Cross - country Race;

(3) In 2016 Track Cycling World Championships, seven athletes were dispatched by CAHK to participate all the events: Sprint, Keirin, Omnium, Scratch, Points Race, Individual Pursuit, Time Trial, Madison;

(4) In 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games, five elite athletes were qualified to compete in the Men's Road Race, Women's Sprint, Women's Keirin, Men's omnium, Women's Omnium, Mountain biking---Men's Cross-Country.

In a nutshell, more opportunities of high-level competitions will be provided to Hong Kong elite cyclists with a sound momentum of development of cycling.

Bidding and Hosting of International Mega Sport Events

In addition, major cycling events have been held in HKV since 2015, including UCI Track Cycling World Cup (2015-16; 2018-19; 2019-20) and UCI Track Cycling Championship in 2017. Therefore, Hong Kong Velodrome not only allows more outstanding track cyclists to train in Hong Kong but also enables Hong Kong to become an Asian sports city. The establishment of the HKV marked the commencement of two-track development (road and track) of Hong Kong Cycling Team (Sportsoho, 2017).

3.5 Hong Kong Swimming

Introduction

It is recognised that swimming is a very popular sport in Hong Kong. In addition, Hong Kong made its debut at Olympics in 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games, in which all of the four athletes were from swimming. However, the development of elite swimming in Hong Kong is lagging behind. In 2016, Siobhan Bernadette Haughey represented Hong Kong in the women's 200-meter freestyle preliminaries at the Rio Olympics and finished in 1:56.91, surpassing her own record of Hong Kong, ranking 9th in the top 16 and becoming the first athlete in Hong Kong swimming history to reach the Olympic semifinals. In the end, her 13th place after the semi-finals made Hong Kong's best result of swimming in the Olympics. Furthermore, Siobhan Bernadette Haughey made constant progress. Her fifth place in the women's 200m Freestyle made her the first Hong Kong swimmer in history to

advance to the finals of the World Championships. But relatively speaking, Hong Kong swimming athletes mostly participate in regional sports mega events or individual events.

Table 9. Medals acquired by Hong Kong Swimming team at Asian Games from 1998 to 2018

Edition	Gold	Silver	Bronze
Bangkok 1998	0	0	1
Doha 2006	0	0	1
Guangzhou 2010	0	0	2
Incheon 2014	0	0	4
Jakarta Palembang 2018	0	1	2

Source: <https://www.olympic.org/olympic-results>

Organisational Structure

In 1951, Hong Kong Amateur Swimming Association (HKASA) was established with the support from the President, Mr. A. de O. Sales. Later on, four swimmers selected by HKASA represented Hong Kong to compete in 1952 Helsinki Olympic Games for the first time. HKASA is a member of the Federation Internationale De Natation (FINA), Asian Swimming Federation (AASF) and Sports Federation and Olympic Committee of Hong Kong, China (SF & OC). HKASA is widely recognised as the only governing body of swimming sports in Hong Kong, which takes charge of swimming, diving, water polo, artistic swimming, open water swimming and masters competitions and activities. HKASA has been making concerted efforts to promote the development of swimming sports in the past 60 years, covering enhancing the advancement of swimming, identifying and cultivating elite athletes and providing training to athletes, officials, judges and coaches in Hong Kong through organising different competitions, training courses and relevant teaching activities. The Association now has over 120 affiliated clubs with over 10,000 registered athletes, offering all properly

accredited persons the opportunity to represent Hong Kong in a wide range of competitions and meetings here and abroad. Additionally, HKSI is in full charge of the whole process of elite athlete training. However, the elaboration and communication between these organisations are not always unhindered. According to one of the interviewees (interviewee A, former elite athlete of HK Swimming Team), unfairness was witnessed during the selection of participants for international competition, during which the champion of the qualification trials was not offered the chance to represent Hong Kong to compete for lack of big event experience. Thus, a lack of commanding leader or authority is an obvious problem.

Coaching

Although it cannot compete with the swimming powers such as Australia and the United States in the World Series, the Chinese swimming team is still outstanding in Asia, ranking only second to Japan in the Asian Games medal list. The Hong Kong swimming team has always maintain close communication with the mainland swimming teams. Exchange of coaches is frequent as well. Chen Jianhong, former China's Swimming team athletes who has participated in 1988 Seoul Olympic Games and 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games and won two gold medals in Asian Games, has been appointed as the head coach of Hong Kong Swimming team since 2000s. Under his leadership, there is emergence of many talented athletes with potential, such as Chung Kwok Leung 、 Chan Yu Ning 、 Fung Wing Yan.

Training

Prior to 2010, most of the swimming athletes trained in different venues which belong to each individual swimming club. And no single specialised facility was provided to athletes in general and elite swimmers in particular for training. Until 2005, a decision was made by HKSI to design and construct a well-equipped training facility for elite swimming in Sha Tin, which is believed to

optimise training conditions and better the development of elite swimming. As commented by interviewee A (former elite athlete of HK Swimming Team):

‘Since the space for training has become larger and space for each individual has been increased, the training effect turned out to be much better than before. We do not have to train with a bunch of people any more’

Due to the coach coming from mainland China, opportunities of training in mainland are proffered, especially plateau training in Kunming, Yunnan Province.

Competition Opportunities

As the emergence of Siobhan Haughey who is the bearer of Asian record in the Women’s 100m and 200m freestyle swimming, the opportunities for Hong Kong elite swimmers to compete in the Olympic Games seem to revive. Furthermore, athletes from Hong Kong are provided with the opportunities to participate in Fina World Championship, Fina Swimming World Cup, Champions Swim Series and World Swimming Championships (25m). In the domain of Asia, chances are open to Hong Kong swimming participants including Asian Games and Asian Swimming Championships.

Bidding and Hosting of International Mega Sport Events

In 1999, the 4th FINA World Swimming Championships (25m) also known as the Short Course Worlds was held in Hong Kong. The competition is held in a short-distance (25m) pool rather than a long course 50-meter one and in years that there is no other major events held by the FINA. Additionally, Hong Kong was awarded the right to host FINA Swimming World Cup (Hong Kong) from 1994 to 2000 and from 2014 to 2017. However, in the past three years, planning to bid for swimming events was not found on the agenda of related organisations or associations which may lead to the stagnant state of development of swimming in Hong Kong, since bidding and hosting sport events is deemed as an opportunity to boost the development of sport and allocate resources

more effectively and efficiently.

3.6 Hong Kong Taekwondo

Introduction

Although the performance of Hong Kong Taekwondo Team is not very competitive in international stages, the sport is very popular that attracts the government attention. For example, Hong Kong has hosted two Asian Taekwondo Championships in 1978 and in 2000. In addition, Hong Kong held the World Taekwondo Championships as early as November 1997, the second time that China sent athletes to participate. However, the performance of Hong Kong Taekwondo Team in Asian competitions and international stages differs obviously. Hong Kong athletes had never won any medals in World Championships or Olympic Games, but performed better and won silver and gold medals in Asian Championships especially before 2000.

Table 10. A summary of Hong Kong's performance in Taekwondo at the Asian Championships from Seoul 1974 to Ho Chi Minh 2018

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
Silver Medal	2	1	0	0	0
Bronze Medal	4	6	3	1	0

Source: http://www.taekwondodata.com/resultlist_country.html?tgid=4&cid=senior

A decline of medal winning of Hong Kong athletes has been witnessed since 2000s. Apart from Leung Chun-lun's bronze medal in the men's 78kg division in the 2000 Asian Championships, no other athletes achieved medals in the Asian championships since then. The best record at the Asian Games was the top eight placed by Poon Chun-ho in 2014 and Law Sin-yi in 2018. Although Taekwondo has been popular with the public since 1980, the development of elite Taekwondo was

lagging behind. It has been regarded as an amateur sport for a long period which resulted in that few athletes are willing to devote themselves full time to training. Taekwondo has never been one of the focus sports launched by HKSDB until 2015 became a Tier B 'Elite Sport' of HKSI. As a result, lack of funds and full-time training athletes has led to a stagnation of taekwondo.

Organisational Structure

The development of Taekwondo in Hong Kong endures a long history. Hong Kong Taekwondo Association (HKTA) was established in 1967, six years earlier than WTF and 28 years earlier than Chinese Taekwondo Association (Beijing, 1995). HKTA is a member of WTF and Asian Taekwondo Union (ATU) and affiliated to SF&OC, whose responsibilities has been to promote Taekwondo in Hong Kong and send athletes to compete in regional and international sports events (HK Taekwondo Association, 2020). Now, there are 44 Taekwondo clubs affiliated to HKTA and as a Tier B sport under EVSS, HKTA receives funding from HKSI to promote elite athletes' development since 2015. In terms of athlete selection for participating Olympic Games and Asian Games, HKTA plays the pivotal role that selecting candidate athletes from the elite team in HKSI for further recruitment by SF&OC. As for regional competition or single-sport competition, HKSI is able to make decision to dispatch athletes.

Coaching

In recent years, Hong Kong's Poomsae has developed rapidly and has made constant progress in many international competitions. For example, in the 2018 Asian Games, the Hong Kong Taekwondo team successfully dispatched four Poomsae athletes to compete. Since 2018, the HKTA has invited overseas coaches to train athletes to receive world-class training to improve the performance of local elite athletes, among whom Kim Sung-hyun from South Korea is the key international coach. This is the second time that Korean coach Kim Sung-hyun led the Hong Kong team in overseas

competitions. Under his instruction, in 2019 Wuxi 2019 WT World Cup Team & Poomsae Championship, The Hong Kong team participated in the men's team Poomsae competition, and finally won third place with the US concurrently which was the first World Cup medal for the Hong Kong (HK01, 2019). Though the employment of Korean Taekwondo coach commenced in recent years, and Poomae Taekwondo which is not an Olympic edition is not subject to mainstream attention, the concept of hiring coaches from countries of strong competitors in this sport is correct.

Training

Unlike the situation in the UK that a well-equipped multifunctional Taekwondo training centre was built for elite athletes in Manchester, there is no independent and separate training ground for elite Taekwondo athletes. The lack of training ground could be attributed to the less funding support because of the poor performance of Hong Kong Taekwondo team in the international stage, which has already become a vicious circle. Ordinarily, Taekwondo athletes are sharing the training ground with Judo athletes, which is regarded as a negative factor constraining the development of Taekwondo. Interviewee D (Coach of Hong Kong Junior team) stated the actual situation:

'We do not have our own training ground, but share the mat with Judo players. It is a common sense that the mat for Taekwondo and Judo are quite different for the latter is fixed and the former is mobile. We have great possibility to get hurt. And we do have many athletes injured during training on the mat for Judo'

As for joint training, because of the poor performance in the international competitions, it is getting hard for Hong Kong Taekwondo team to find appropriate country to collaborate. Interviewee D (Coach of Hong Kong Junior team) supplemented:

'Internationally, Hong Kong team is recognised as independent regional team which share the same position with countries like China, Korea and Japan. Normally, we should apply joint training with these countries. However, our performance is so bad that no competitive countries would like to

elaborate with us'

Thus, currently, Hong Kong Taekwondo team looks for some local training place in cities in mainland China and European countries with less spending.

Bidding and Hosting of International Mega Sport Events

HKTA was awarded the right to host 1997 World Taekwondo Championships and 2000 Asian Taekwondo Championships. Since the return to China in 1997, the development of elite sport in Hong Kong was rather rapid. In line with the Chief Executive's philosophy, the SAR Government has shown great interest in and support for the advancement of elite sports. Meritocratic performance and hosting sports mega events are considered effective ways to enhance Hong Kong's soft power as Asian World city. Hong Kong has started its road to bid for mega sport events including 2006 Asian Games and 2009 East Asian Games since then. Unfortunately, Hong Kong did not win the bidding to host 2006 Asian Games in Doha. Mega sport events can be an engine to drive the HKTA forward. Substantial competition opportunities on the home soil and enormous exposure to the public were believed to enhance the development of Taekwondo. As a retired Taekwondo athlete who had represented Hong Kong to compete in international stage, interviewee Q said that it is believed that at that time the Government holds high expectation of Taekwondo of high performances. However, having investing an amount of money to hold the highest-class competitions the government did not see any progress or achievements of elite Taekwondo and then they became disappointed (Interviewee Q). That probably explains why Hong Kong has never host or even bid for world-level Taekwondo competition during the last two decades.

Competition Opportunities

Currently, Hong Kong Taekwondo players are eligible for competing in Asian Games, Asian Championship and World Championship, but not Olympic Games. In recent years, Hong Kong

athletes competed and achieved some accomplishments in international Poomsae competitions. But Poomsae Taekwondo is not a recognised edition at the Olympics. At the international level of WTF competitions which are the only recognised edition in the Olympic Games. Due to different competition rules in Poomsae Taekwondo, competing in Poomsae Taekwondo may distract and dilute the training effect for Olympic Games preparation for the long term. For the benefit of Hong Kong elite Taekwondo development, focus on WTF Kyorugi international competitions will be the right direction to excel in Olympics.

Shared supportive system of the Hong Kong Cycling, Swimming and Taekwondo from HKSI

Financial Support

The government is regarded as the most significant source of funding for the development of elite sports including cycling (Tier A*), swimming (Tier A) and Taekwondo (Tier B). Sport Subvention Scheme from LCSO has been allocated to these three NSAs to help them promote their sports in schools. It provides a significant financial source for these sports in grass root level which can broaden their athlete base for the elite development. For example, the financial aid provided to CAHK has been increasing annually, and about 40% increase from 2018 to 2019.

Table 11. A summary of SSS to CAHK from 2014 to 2019

Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total cash						
subvention	5,419,588	5,670,935	6,729,654	6,909,177	7,377,760	10,380,901
(HKD)						

Source: <http://www.cycling.org.hk/page.aspx?corpname=hkca&i=732&locale=en-US>

Another major financial source for these three elite sports is EADF from HKSI. HKSI is the government's executive arm for elite sports development. The financial support to elite sport from government has been growing over seven times in the past two decades as mentioned in previous Government Funding Support section. Cycling, as an elite sport ranking A* has additional financial

support than Tier A and B sports. In 2020 to 2021, there are 26 senior full-time cyclists, 18 junior full-time cyclists, 2 junior part-time cyclists and 16 potential cyclists in the cycling group (HKSI, 2020a). The training grants they receive vary with their performances in international sports events. For a senior full-time athlete who once win a medal at Olympic Games or World Championships, the monthly grant will be as much as HK\$48,240. For a top eight athletes at Asian Championships or National Games, the monthly grant will be a minimum of HK\$11,520. In addition, the grants of other full-time athletes and part-time athletes differ a lot. For example, the standard grant to a full-time athlete who wins the 4th to the 8th place at Olympic Games is HK\$32,730 per month, while for a part-time athlete under the same circumstance the grant is only HK\$10,070 (HKSI, 2020b). Although these three elite sports are allocated different sizes of funding to athletes training, competition and facilities from the EADF, HKSI, they have been enjoying a centralized and relatively stable funding support from the Hong Kong government.

Talent Identification and Athlete Development

The role of talent identification (TID) unit of HKSI is supportive in nature. TID is working with NSA to design and carry out talent identification programmes. Generally, most of the aforementioned TI programmes are requested by different NSAs. Currently, ten NSA from Tier A* and A elite sports are involved in TI programmes. Before the formal TI programmes in TID, HKSI, NSAs usually identify and select young potential athletes through inter-school competitions and Young Athletes Training Scheme in different sports. After a longer term training in school or community level, the chosen young athletes will be sent to HKSI as “potential athletes” to gain further elite training and become “elite athlete” if they are good enough. Not until the young athletes are admitted into HKSI as “potential athletes”, NSA coaches seldom adopt scientific measurements but subjective experience, observation and school competition results to identify young athletes with potential. It may be a loophole of TID. In addition, at present, there is no systematic talent transfer program. One exception

was that in 2016, a young wind surfing “potential athlete” chose to transfer to rowing and eventually became a member of Hong Kong team to compete in the 2016 Rio Olympics. This talent transfer case is only initiated by the young athlete himself and no established mechanism is available within the system to maximize athletes’ potential and strengthen Hong Kong teams winning edge.

Scientific Research

A comprehensive sport science support system has been provided by the Elite Training Science & Technology under HKSI for all elite sports including these three events in the present study. Compared to scientific and technology support from the government organisations and Universities for each individual sport in particular in the UK, there is no conventional sports science research development cooperation plan or long term strategy with any university in Hong Kong to improve the performance and ability of elite athletes, except a few individual case initiated by the focus sport with the enterprise. These projects are normally irregular and non-institutional. The sports science research unit of HKSI is mainly supportive and service-oriented. Basically, all sports science research development and services are requested by the head coach if any.

Limitation:

28 interviews for Hong Kong key stakeholders was an ideal plan mentioned in the proposal. Currently, 19 interviews were conducted in Hong Kong covering nine from the government and general sports governing bodies including the HAB, LCSD, SF&OC, HKSI, SC and ESC, and 10 sport-specific interviews for three selected sports (director or deputy director of the three association, team leader/performance manager, head coach, one non-head coach and two athletes for CAHK, HKASA and HKTA). These interviews have already covered all the related and significant interviewees on this policy study. Therefore, the results are satisfactory and sufficient to provide a comprehensive understanding of the current sport policy in HK. Regarding the reasons of the

interviewees who rejected our invitation are: busy, not in HK, don't want to share the information because it's confidential. For those interviewees from the selected sports (e.g. director or deputy director of the three association), the reasons of rejection are: they consider the interview may put them under pressure from their NSAs or damage their career in the future. To conclude, the change in the number of interviewees in HK doesn't produce significant bias when interpret the findings of HK sport policy.

“Quoted from proposal:

As a notable feature of semi-structured interviews, it is difficult to identify the exact number of interviews in advance, because of the availability of interviewees and the possibility of ‘unplanned’ interviews through snowballing. The general plan is to conduct approximately 28 interviews for Hong Kong, including ten from the government and general sports governing bodies including the HAB, LCSO, SF&OC, HKSI, SC and ESC, and 18 sport-specific interviews for three selected sports (director or deputy director of the three association, team leader/performance manager, head coach, one non-head coach and two athletes for CAHK, HKASA and HKTA).

Theoretical reflection from the policy transfer and policy implementation:

In terms of policy transfer and learning, Tan et al. (2019) advanced Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996) Model of policy transfer process to five dimensions: rationale, actors, sources, elements and conditioning factors, which proffered a pathway to better analyse the process of policy transfer in the domain of elite sport. In this study, the ‘source’ was removed simply because the policy learning and transfer of the three selected sports were between UK and HK.

- **Rationale.** The term ‘Rationale’ is concerned with why organisations and individuals choose to proceed policy transfer. Rationale refers to why does a nation seek the transfer of elite sport

policy and lessons from foreign nations in this study. Firstly, Hong Kong's rather undesirable performances at Olympic Games urged relative administrations and organisations to seek solutions to this problem. Thus, inviting high-level coaches from abroad or Mainland China to help improve training quality has been prioritized. Take the Hong Kong Cycling Team for example, Mr. Shen Jinkang, the renowned and former Chinese Cycling Team coach, was nominated as the head coach of Hong Kong Cycling Team, and then cultivated many outstanding athletes such as Wong Kam-po and Lee Wai Sze. Furthermore, a fear of lagging behind major rival nations was another rationale for Hong Kong to deploy policy transfer. Except the gold medal attained at 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, Hong Kong simply acquired one medal every 8 years. In the meanwhile, many countries and districts in East Asia and Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Chinese Taipei have achieved the breakthrough of gold medal or attained more medals than Hong Kong. All these aforementioned examples further explain why Hong Kong sought to learn policy from UK.

- **Actors.** 'Actors' refers to the people involved in the policy transfer process. To elaborate, it means who are the key actors involved in this policy transfer process. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) divided policy transfer actors into nine categories, which are elected officials, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supra-national governmental institutions and consultants. Furthermore, Hudson and Lowe (2004) advanced their classification and divided the main actors of policy transfer into three categories according to their relationship with government: insiders, outsiders and global players. 'Insiders' refers to those who work within the state political system, such as politicians, civil servants and party officials. In most research in relation to policy transfer, they have been highlighted as the most significant agents (Stone, 1999, 2002). 'Outsiders' consists of non-governmental organisations and individuals, most notably think tanks, pressure groups and corporations. 'Global players' encompasses supranational governmental and

non-governmental organisations and policy entrepreneurs, experts and consultants. In general, the three types of actors identified by Hudson and Lowe (2004) are the three significant groups of agents promoting policy transfer, with insiders tending to be the most powerful and having the most notable impact during the transfer process. In this study, the actors are mainly identified in relation to sporting organisations, including the HKSI and the NSAs. Insiders are thus the most common actors in the policy transfer process. The most common insider in the three cases is the coach or head coach, who uses their interpersonal connections to arrange training for the athletes. The success of British Swimming are partially attributed to its former head coach, Bill Sweetman, who is from Australia, a swimming nation. Similarly, Hong Kong applied the same approach of choosing coaches from nations adept at swimming, particularly in Asia. Coaches from Mainland China provided the team with more opportunities to train and compete with more preminent athletes in Mainland China. The coaches of the Taekwondo team in the text of the study also mentioned that training sites depend on the coaches' personal connections. Therefore, insiders, or to be more specific, coaches play a significant role in the process of policy transfer.

- **Elements/content.** 'Content' denotes the element that is being transferred in this process or what is the policy content that has been learnt. Dolowitz (2000) categorised the completeness of the transfer into four degrees: copying (complete transfer of the entire policy), emulation (transferring idea behind a policy or a programme), mixture of different policies (transferring a mixture of different policies or programmes), and inspiration (using policy idea in other countries to inspire renewed appraisals towards policy problems). Copying and emulation may not be desirable and ideal practices for HK to learn from UK due to the specific and unique political, physical and social environment in HK. The mixture and inspiration approaches including the organizational structure, financial support, talent identification and athlete development, coaching, training, balance of training and competition, sport funding source, winning philosophy, scientific research with universities, international influence, and bidding

and hosting of international mega sport events could be more appropriate to fit in HK context at this stage. Take Cycling Association of Hong Kong, China Limited' (CAHK) as an example, major cycling events have been held in Hong Kong Velodrome (HKV) since 2015, including UCI Track Cycling World Cup (2015-16; 2018-19; 2019-20) and UCI Track Cycling Championship in 2017. This practice may help explain the successful elite development in cycling elite athletes in recent years through the mixture and inspiration approaches.

- **Conditioning factors.** 'Conditioning factors' refers to factors that condition policy transfer or what factors impact the outcome of the policy transfer. Unlike other policy areas, competitiveness is the most visible and common conditioning factor in elite sport (Tan et al., 2019). When two competitors are evenly matched, both teams are expected reluctant to transfer successful policies, while the competence between the two competitors is too wide, the process of policy transfer is impractical. Since 2018, the HKTA has invited Kim Sung-hyun from South Korea to coach Hong Kong athletes. Under his instruction, The Hong Kong team won the third place and its first World Cup medal in the Wuxi 2019 WT World Cup Team & Poomsae Championship (HK01, 2019). The chemistry between South Korea Taekwondo and Hong Kong team is just right to produce the conditioning factor which benefit the Hong Kong Taekwondo team.

In order to maximise the optimal outcome, recommendations will be conceived and proposed around the theoretical underpinnings which are policy transfer and policy learning, and the theory of ten ingredients of perfect implementation.

1. Policy Learning and Transfer

It is notable that in this project, the employed policy transfer and learning is "voluntary", which is driven by Hong Kong's poor performance at the Olympic Games and dissatisfaction of stakeholders in sports governing bodies. As concluded by different scholars (Bach & Taylor, 2003; Benson, 2009;

Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996), policy transfer is easier to succeed when the following conditions occur. They are high policy demand, low resistance, more generic, less unique and less complex programmes, favorable path dependency, enabling, supportive and more feasibly substitutable institutional structure with low structural density, less intense politicisation, adequate resources, ideological consistency, smaller-scale changes and a low degree of programmatic adjustment.

However, what is worth mentioning is that, according to Zheng (2019), source nations of policy transfer is an inevitable factor which determine whether the process of transfer will go smoothly or not. The UK is selected as the source nation of policy transfer and learning in this project for its success in the development of elite sport and colonised legacy in Hong Kong especially those in government administration and systems. Both of which tend to have good reference for the learning of sport-related policy in Hong Kong. In addition, a huge gap in strength and competitiveness at Olympics prevents the UK from treating Hong Kong as a direct competitor. Thus, there is no reluctance for the UK to share its advanced experience and expertise with Hong Kong.

High political demand is another factor to be taken into consideration to favor the process of learning and transferring. Though enormous funding has been poured into elite sport, the general performance of Hong Kong delegations at Olympic Games and other sports-mega events was unsatisfactory, which urged the government and related organisations to find a more viable way to fulfill the mission of achieving success at Olympics. A more feasibly substitutable institutional structure with low structural density is another distinct factor determining the transferability propitious or not. On the basis of the analysis of the organisational structure within Hong Kong, a redundancy in departments and unclear powers and responsibilities between different sports agencies were identified as the problem hindering the development of elite sport and transferability of foreign experience and expertise, which urged the government to find a pathway to overcome.

2. Policy Implementation

In regard to the theory of policy implementation, three of the ten ingredients of ‘perfect implementation’ were identified and employed during the process of proffering recommendations.

- a. The first ingredient is ‘adequate time and sufficient resources that are made available to the programme’. Actors such as time sufficiency, financial and human resources are key factors determining the success of implementation. In this project, whether the Hong Kong government has enough patience to map out and implement a long-term strategy for the advancement of elite sport. In other words, the absence of a long-term strategy means inconsistency in policy. Many of those countries with outstanding medal performance at Olympics are well equipped with a series of sophisticated long-term strategy for high performance, for example, Sport Australia’s *Australia’s Winning Edge 2012-2022*, Japan’s *Suzuki Plan* issued in 2016 and China’s three consecutive versions of *The Outline of the Strategic Olympic Glory Plan* are illustrations of the utility of systematic and deliberate national elite sport strategies and the UK’s various of strategies and programmes in advancing elite sport.
- b. The second ingredient making contribution to policy implementation is “smooth communication and harmonised coordination amongst different governing bodies or agencies”. Judging from the aforementioned analysis, a lack of communication and elaboration between key stakeholders in Hong Kong result in inefficiency and ineffectiveness during the working process. A more clear division of responsibility of different agencies will make it much easier to communicate and have mutual understanding. Take the mode applied in the UK for example, UK Sport, as the governing body of all sports in general and elite sport in particular domestically, take the responsibility of coordinating all the sports agencies and allocating money to different national sport agencies. During the process of the UK’s sports organisations’ operation, related agencies such as EIS, British cycling, the National Lottery, DCMS work in elaboration without any barriers.
- c. The three ingredient is ‘that in authority can demand and obtain perfect compliance’. In other words, absolute obedience and acceptance to demands and requirements form the leading

authority and centralised system will favor the implementation of policy. Despite the organisational system is sound, which is comprised of SF&OC, HAB, HKSI and multiple NSAs, a lack of a demanding authorised organisation that can take the whole situation into account, plan accordingly and elaborate with every sport agencies. An actor with these functions is able to draw the whole picture for the future development of elite sports in Hong Kong and improve the working efficiency.

Policy implementation and recommendations

Premised on the results collected by the documentary analysis and interviews, a number of recommendations are provided below, aiming to enhance the elite sport performance of Hong Kong when compared to UK experience. Consistent with the nature of an entire strategic process, this section is divided into short-term, and mid-to long-term recommendations.

A. Short-Term Recommendations

- a. Increasing centralisation of the organisational structure: The UK restructured its sport structures in 1995 and became more centralised with the establishment and reform of DCMS, UK Sport, Sport England, National Governing Bodies (NGBs), and Youth Sport Trust. The aims were to provide more systematic and integrated support for elite sport development and to improve relationships and reconciliations between government and national sport organisations in the UK. Currently, in Hong Kong, Elite Sports Committee (ESC) under Sports Commission and the remit of the ESC is limited to an advisory role. Furthermore, the HKSI is responsible for the elite athlete training. As the most prominent government organisations to develop elite sport policy, neither of them can exert significant impact. Therefore, to establish a more centralised governance Bureau to draft, design and formulate elite athlete policy should be considered in Hong Kong.
- b. A prominent ad hoc elite sport agency: Among the key actors in elite sport policy, the role and functions of UK Sport has been the most salient because it acts as the primary agency/peak body to provide strategic moves to reach elite athletes' medal winning potential. The recent Olympic medal table illustrates UK Sport's achievement, illustrated by the fact that UK moves up to the 2nd place in 2016 Rio Olympics from 36th place in 1996 Atlanta Olympics. When compared to the existing Hong Kong elite sport structure, no similar strategic organisation – a semi-governmental high performance-specific governing body such as UK Sport (and similarly Sport Australia, Japan Sports Agency and Sport Singapore) functions and delivers direct and instrumental impact

on the performance (e.g. investment, evaluation and solutions), events (investment, bidding and support), international (influence and development), governance, leadership, financial accounting, science, medicine and technology in elite sport. Inspired by UK Sport's capacity for producing elite sport medal success most notably at but not limited to the Olympic Stage, the establishment of this type of strategic and influential *ad hoc* high performance organisation such as UK Sport in Hong Kong to deliver direct and strategic impact on elite sport excellence would be a valuable option.

- c. Sport strategy policy: The UK has promulgated a series of landmark sport-related policy documents such as *Sport: Raising the Game* (1995), *A Sporting Future for All* (2000), *Elite Sports Funding Review* (2001), *Game Plan* (2002) and *World Class Performance Programme* (2012). Elite sport policies should be addressed by government more frequently and professionally because they will enable the public and government to direct more attention to the value, utility and importance of elite sport development in the society. Additionally, through different sport consultancy studies, the government can gain more insights and ideas to posit our elite sport policy and identify specific strategies to direct short and long-term development of elite sport in Hong Kong.
- d. Winning philosophy: The UK has stressed the winning philosophy through the ruthless yet efficient and effective "No Compromise" funding approach that demonstrated a result-driven method of funding elite sports based on their number of medals and completion of medal/performance targets. The winning philosophy is further reflected by the Australian and American swimming coaches' motto 'Winning is the only option, we don't want to know about anything else' (quoted in Dryden, 2002, p. 13) when they were employed to train UK swimming athletes for the 2012 London and 2016 Rio Olympic Games. British Cycling also demonstrated their winning philosophy by claiming that "medal or nothing", and "fourth is not good enough". In a similar sense, their coaching philosophy has changed the athletes' mind set to win when they

are trained to prepare for international competitions. This winning philosophy underpins and accords with the goal setting strategy, evidenced in the “Succeed on the world stage” campaign implemented by British Cycling between 2013 and 2017. They showed their determination to success by highlighting that ‘the best opportunity to remodel your business is when you are at rock bottom with your back to the wall’. This commitment, single-mindedness and determination can be encouraged to be promoted to other NSAs including the Hong Kong counterparts. In addition, this goal setting strategy can facilitate an organic synthesis of the “No Compromise” funding strategy and a more centralized governance structure.

- e. The internationalisation of the coaching squad: Team GB’s newfound success at the Olympic Games are attributed to the employment of experienced and quality international coaches with a successful track record. Illustrative examples include British Swimming and British Taekwondo which recruited, world-leading coaches from Australia and the USA (for swimming) and from South Korea (for taekwondo in 2013), which spurred the notable progress with and made notable contributions to Great Britain’s Olympic (medal) successes in respective sports. Currently, HKSI has employed 10 head coaches (50%) of the 20 Tier A* and A sports from overseas, mainly from UK (7), USA (2) and Australia (1), China mainland (5) and local (5). In terms of quantity, it is already ideal. If possible, a more demanding employment of foreign coaches and a relatively more objective selection criterion, including their track record in sport-specific coaching career should be specified. The financial offer and lifestyle support (e.g. accommodation, medical allowance, family education allowance and travelling allowance) need to be competitive for those world class coaches to come to Hong Kong, particularly for emerging sports such as taekwondo.
- f. Rewards to coaches for their athletes’ Olympic medal winning performances: UK NGBs provided cash allowance to individual coach for Gold, Silver and Bronze Olympic medals respectively. Additional incentives will be given when athletes trained by the coach win multiple medals. This measure provides significant linkage between the athletes’ success and the coach’s

reward. Consequently, motivation to win and high inspiration emerge in both athletes and coaches.

- g. The production of world-class coaches: As British Swimming stated, Team GB is endowed with some very good swimming coaches, but the governing body needs to invest more materialistic and human resources to produce more world class coaches. Progressive courses have been organised and awards have been provided to enhance local coaches' competitiveness by British Cycling and UK Sport. A notable example was the Elite Coaching Apprenticeship Programme, and Regional Coaching Plan. High performance coaching programme and GB Talent Pathway coaching camps have been delivered by British Taekwondo to stimulate more interaction and knowledge exchange among British Taekwondo coaches. In the case of the HKSI, there are coaching certificate programmes and courses offered to contribute to the enhancement of coaches' expertise and development, but more sport-specific coaching courses will be more instrumental in producing world class coaches and consequently pursuing desirable results in training.
- h. Priority and balance between training and competitions: British Swimming changed its training strategy from 'minimal training, maximum competition' to 'adequate training, highest level competition'. It means that multi-dimensional and sufficient training for athlete takes precedence, followed by organising athletes to target highest-level competitions/events only. British Cycling also adopted this strategy. They only sent their elite athletes to most 'nutritious' events such as the World Championships, European Championship, World Cup and Series, which can enable better preparation for the four Olympic cycling disciplines (i.e. track, road, mountain bike and BMX). Their competition schedule and arrangement is very pragmatic and predominantly focuses on their Olympic goals. Consequently, elite athletes can be equipped with the best condition to compete the most important events. This strategy between training and competition can be further refined in Hong Kong, because most Hong Kong NGBs competition strategy is

haphazard, failing to scientifically balance competition participation and training.

- i. Intensive and integrated training centres: British Swimming established Intensive Training Centres to provide a one-stop integrated service training for elite athletes in one location. Within this training centre, competition-specific system was tailored-made to individual athletes. British Cycling as one of the trailblazers adopting a highly centralised approach including the training centre, or rather, headquarters in Manchester, because they believed resources can be functioned in a more efficient and effective way, and they can train elite athletes much better under the same roof to cultivate “competitive beasts”. British Taekwondo is also based in Manchester, where ‘World Class Performance’ programme is carried out with the support from UK Sport and National Lottery. All these three GB teams are believers in the virtue of intensive and integrated training centres as a pre-requisite to elite sport success. Although the HKSI has been consistent in providing one-stop integrated service training for elite athletes in one location, it lacks bespoke tailoring training to each elite sport in Hong Kong. Instead, athletes in priority sports are trained in different places and regions around the world because Hong Kong lacks integrated training centres for each sport. It will be ideal if integrated training centres for each sport can be established, to at least supplement the existing approach.
- j. The aggregation of marginal gains: British Cycling concluded from their performances at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games that ‘the aggregation of marginal gains’ could combine to make a big impact and act as a key push factor for sustainable group advantage. They suggested that every additional 1% of improvement (e.g. helmets, pedals, sleeping and jerseys) underpin their dominance in international cycling competitions. Reflecting on British Cycling’s successful rise from tragic to magic, incrementalism is recommend for a careful scrutiny in Hong Kong with respect to the applicability for various Hong Kong sports teams to gain their various extra 1% of advantage through their training and scientific support. Attention to detail, or rather, all performance enhancement-related factors and detail (legally) would be a powerful prescription.

- k. Quick response to new international sport trends: British Cycling is characterised by their quick responses and proactive strategy regarding the observation, understanding and mastery of changes and latest trends, especially from the close examination of new trends, proposals and policies from the International Olympic Committee and Union Cyclist Internationale. For examples, British Cycling had upgraded BMX as a higher priority when BMX was announced to be a new Olympic sport discipline at Beijing 2008. In a similar sense, at the London 2012 Olympics, British Cycling targeted the new Omnium events and increased number of women's cycling events in advance when the number of male cycling event was reduced at London 2012. The sensitivity, flexibility and responsiveness to rapid international changes/trends can be critical in the 21st century because external factors are diverse and unpredictable such as the COVID-19 and international relations. To establish a contingency mechanism in Hong Kong to observe and address these changes/new trends is imperative. Again, where and how to proceed this new mechanism depends upon the restructure of the centralised governance.
- l. The accent on sport science and the role of universities: Akin to England Institute of Sport (EIS), the HKSI has specialised in the biomechanics, physiology, psychology, fitness and conditioning, sport medicine, nutrition, and lifestyle support. Two suggestions may be effective in advancing athletes training and performance, applying the EIS experience in British Cycling. The first inspiration is the incrementalism approach mentioned above by conducting more sport science performance research and generating objective and scientific data to identify and acquire more areas and sources of the extra 1% marginal gains for athletes. The second proposal is to intensify research collaborations between the sport science units, HKSI and the sport science and sport medicine faculties in Hong Kong universities. The UK represents a long and commendable tradition in relation to the involvement of leading universities and the integration of academic resources, illustrated by various British NGBs' longstanding and effective partnerships with Loughborough University, University of Bath, Sheffield Hallam University, Northumbria

University and University of Sterling. These universities have been consistent in providing scientific support for various British NGBs and national squad, and these universities' and scholars' areas of expertise range from equipment, clothing and nutrition, to training methods, psychology, recovery and rehabilitation. For example, British Cycling research allows no spare body weight of the athlete based upon the nutrition and clothing findings, put the bike into the wind tunnel to investigate the aerodynamics. To summarize, UK Sports and British Cycling have maximized the synergy between sport science research and elite sport performance. Although the sport science research in Hong Kong universities are not as advanced as the UK, it will be a good and significant point of departure if the synergy between sport science research and elite sport performance can be deepened.

B. Mid- to Long-Term Recommendations

- a. Bidding to and the hosting of international mega sport events: It is evident that the successful bid in 2005 to host the London 2012 Olympics acted as a powerful impetus that promoted the 10 Downing Street to further prioritise elite sport within the Cabinet. The UK government decided to more effectively prepare for the medal success on home soil, which merited and warranted wide-ranging support that covered the areas of organisational restructure, financial support, sport science support, coaching internationalisation, talent identification, athlete training and development system, irrespective of the ruling parties in the British Isles. For example, UK Sport's annual investment on elite sport reached the historical high in 2012-13. This phenomenon indicates that mega sport events, especially the Olympic Games, Asian Games, Youth Olympic Games, have a locomotive effect and provide political legitimacy for policy decisions that favour elite sport development. This driving force will induce a demand for mid-and long-term policy development to achieve the medal-winning outcome. Taking British Taekwondo as an example, the UK won the bid to host the, 2019 World Championships, the 2021 and 2023 World Taekwondo

Grand Prix Final and the 2022 European Taekwondo Championships. The hosting of these world class Taekwondo events shows the determination of further improvement of British Taekwondo's competitiveness at the Olympics. Consequently, a more strategic positioning and plan will be established instead of short-term goals. From a cost-effective perspective, two options are recommended the first of which is to bid to and host the Youth Olympic Games which is more manageable regarding its cost and scale of the event, which could act as a rehearsal for larger-scale sports mega events. Learning from Singapore's successful hosting experience in 2010, Hong Kong could also consider hosting this event considering the cultural, geographical and financial similarities between these two cities. The second option is to co-host the Asian Games with Shenzhen and Guangzhou both of which have already hosted Asian Games in 2010 and Summer Universiade Games in 2011 respectively. Hong Kong can maximise the mega sport event impact by synergising their sport venues, accommodations and mega sport event management experiences. Furthermore, transportation between these cities with Hong Kong becomes much more convenient and accessible. The cost to host the Games can be reduced significantly too.

- b. Talent identification: Fuelled by London's acquisition of the right to host the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in 2005, UK Sport and other British NGBs has placed great emphasis on identifying and developing those talented young athletes as Olympic medal winners in 6-8 years through the Talent identification and confirmation programme' and *Playing to Win: A new era for sport*. This measure is also reflected in British Swimming that introduced the Australian talent identification system (Long Term Athlete Development) in 2003. Both British Swimming and British Cycling adopted a vigorous talent identification system. There are two programmes worthy of learning from British Cycling. The first is the female Girl4Gold programme which directed British Cycling's deliberate search and exploration of the female specific programmes based upon the strong elite foundation and development of males cycling. This strategy

establishes a better foundation and winning edge for female cycling at the Olympic Games. Of particular note is that they can borrow the successful experiences and training methods from their male compatriots. The Second is the Fast Track Programme which refers to talent transfer from other sports. It is a quicker way to nurture medallists by helping the transferred athlete make a smooth transition into the competitive cycling events.

British Taekwondo is no exception, which launched ‘The Fighting Chance’ campaign in 2009 and ‘Battle4Brazil’ in 2012 to better prepare for the 2016 Rio Olympics. These two campaigns aimed to recruit 16 to 26-year-old male and female combat athletes from all kicking sports to enhance the medal winning possibilities in Olympic Taekwondo by broadening talent pool for taekwondo. These fast track programmes bore fruit at the 2012 and 2016 Olympics. British Taekwondo also employed a holistic development ‘GB Taekwondo Player Development Framework’ to nurture junior athletes’ personal growth with their parents to equip them for a long-term elite development journey. This framework is very functional in the elite athlete development programmes and can better promote the elite athletes’ psychological growth and life skills in the future.

Although the HKSI has established the Talent Identification and Development Unit, its functions and strategy have not been fully developed to nurture talented young athletes regarding its quality and quantity in elite sport. The HKSI is expected to strengthen the Talent Identification and Development by formulating a mid-long term strategy through consultancy study, referring to the literature and successful international practices. Moreover, talent transfer from Fast Track Programme in the context of Great Britain can be referred.

- c. Alignment between financial support and medal winning capabilities: The National Lottery funding has been the major funder to all sports at the elite level in the UK, including British Cycling, British Swimming and British Taekwondo. The “No Compromise” funding to British Cycling increased by 17.5% and 17.4% in the London and Rio Olympiads respectively and

reached £30 million in 2016. Furthermore, the World Class Performance Programme provided an additional £2 million to support international cycling competitions between 2007 and 2013. When British Taekwondo won a bronze medal at Beijing Olympics, there was a significant increase in funds allocated to the British Taekwondo Team to better prepare for the London 2012 and Rio de Janeiro 2016, according to the result-contingent 'No Compromise' approach.

Regarding the 2020 Tokyo Olympic cycle, more than nine million pounds were already allocated to British Taekwondo. This huge and continuous rise in funding also apply to British Cycling and British Taekwondo (Swimming?). This financial increase reflects the winning philosophy, drive for and commitment to medals, performance-based funding criteria and management by objectives. On the contrary, the 'No Compromise' funding strategy also demonstrated ruthless and uncompromising funding cut if medal tally drops below standard. When looking at the funding size and scale of British Cycling, it is enormous, which is beyond what priority sports in Hong Kong can compare, although the HK government has increased the Elite Athletes Development Fund from 2011 to 2019 (HK\$13 billion) to provide a stable and long-term funding source to support elite sports in Hong Kong. It should be borne in mind that Olympic medal success is a very expensive investment. Using British cycling as an example, at least six times funding is allocated when compared to HK Cycling team. Therefore, if funding size and scale cannot be strengthened, more demanding selection of priority sports should be considered to achieve higher medal winning possibilities. The HKSI has identified four 'A*' sports, 16 'A' sports and 13 'B'-tiered sports. These three-tiered sport categorisation scheme resonate with Great Britain's three-level counterpart (Podium, Development, Talent Identification and Confirmation) on the basis of the likelihood of winning medals at the Olympic Games. Because of the expensive investment of Olympic medal winning, the number of priority sports deserve a more precise calculation and balance between the funding support and medal winning capabilities.

- d. National identity formation: The creation and implementation of government policy to nurture and promote national identity through school sport and elite sport cannot be underrated. UK sport policy has provided us with an example that the national identity is a fundamental basis to drive the elite sport policy forward within the government. As a result, the linkage between national identity and elite sport achievement becomes one of the major policies in the broader political and socio-cultural context of Hong Kong within which sport including elite sport is fundamentally embedded.
- e. International representation and influence in international sport organisations and federations: Key positions in International Federations (IFs) are very important to individual elite sport development and performance. For example, Brian Cookson from Great Britain was elected as the president of the UCI in 2013. Since then, the interests of British Cycling can be represented and safeguarded when critical discussions and decisions related to British Cycling. To develop international influence and voice has been the important task of British Cycling to provide advantage for the national team. The Olympic Games has been the paramount pursuit for most sports. The international influence and voice among international sport bodies/federations can definitely make the extra 1% gain in elite sports and its results. Hong Kong should head for this direction if the region wants to win more medals in Olympic Games, Asian Games and World Championships. UK Sport's launch of the International Leadership Programme and detailed support that involved NGBs provide a good template for Hong Kong.

The establishment of long-term strategy: The UK government has valued elite sport success since John Major's tenure in the early 1990s. UK Sport has been restructuring and accumulating their strength through many effective and evidence-based sport prioritisation strategies (in particular in cycling): A series of landmark policies: *Sport: Raising the Game* (Department for National Heritage, DNH, 1995), *Lottery Fund Strategy, 1999-2009* (Sport England, 1999), *A Sporting Future for All* (DCMS, 2000), *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), *Playing to Win: A new*

era for sport (DCMS, 2008), *Creating a sporting habit for life: A new youth sport strategy* (DCMS, 2012) and *Sporting future: A new strategy for an active nation* (DCMS, 2015). All these indicated the determination and well-planned strategy of UK especially after London won the bid to host 2012 London Olympics. These long-term strategies with specific and organic cooperation among the key actors in elite sport enabled Team GB to establish and maintain Olympic gold medals success in the last decade. Comparable examples include *UK Sport Business Plan 2017-2021* and *Australia's Winning Edge 2012-2022*. However, unfortunately, a long-term elite sport-specific strategy is not a feature in Hong Kong, which adversely affects the establishment and sustainability of Hong Kong's competitive advantage on the elite sport arena, because of a lack of clear strategic direction, vision and goals.

Conclusion and limitation

After the data collection from the documentary analysis and interviews of UK and Hong Kong, we focused upon the organizational structure, financial support, talent identification and athlete development, coaching, training, competition opportunities, scientific research, and international influence to explore the lessons Hong Kong may learn to improve our medal winning record. Although we have conducted the policy analysis and comparison between UK and HK sport policy, especially through the three successful Olympic events, policy transferability are under many conditions and constraints including policy tradition, economic resources, social environment, organizational structure, priority of the problems and expectations. It should be noted that the recommendations are purely established based upon the UK success in the past two decades. It does not represent the only way or approach to be successful in the elite sport arena because rules and regulations of Olympic sports have been changed rapidly and constantly. The only thing we can assure is that a longer term strategy must be set up to face this keen competition and challenges in Olympic Games. With a more vibrant and determined strategy, Olympic medals can be feasible.

The present study also has limitations. It did not demonstrate any causal relationship between the research questions and the findings. Furthermore, qualitative research is not statistically representative. Quantitative studies could be a supplementary method to demonstrate the generalizable concepts or pictures of the research question. Patterns and trends are difficult to pinpoint based upon the present findings. Findings of the HK must be interpreted in a cautious manner due to the small sample sizes of interviews. Finally, although two researchers from Loughborough University and University of Northumbria were interviewed through email or Wechat, and with substantial information available from policy documents in UK, the lack of UK interviews due to COVID-19 reminds us that the findings and interpretation must be cautious.

Public dissemination:

Due to the COVID-19, the invited professors (Prof. Barrie Houlihan and Dr. Veerle De Bosscher) cannot come to Hong Kong to deliver the seminars/open lectures. Press conference is also cancelled due to the social distancing policy. A Zoom lecture presentation will be done to distribute the findings and recommendations of the study by the end of March 2021. The Zoom lecture will be uploaded to the You Tube through the HKBU channel. You Tube link will be emailed to the key stakeholders including HAB, LCSD, HKSF&OC, HKSI, NSAs, NGOs, and media.

Regarding the publication, the paper “A Historical Review of Elite Sport Development in Hong Kong” is already in press in the Asian Journal of Sport History & Culture. Another paper “From Zero to Hero: The Development of Elite Cycling in Hong Kong” is presented in “The 2020 Yokohama Sport Conference, Yokohama, Japan” on 8 Sept. 2020.

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